呕吐,修正。法兰克福式案例意在激励(或成为激励的一种方式)这样一种观点:指导控制(自由行动)是道德责任所需的全部自由(而做其他事情的自由——管制控制)不是道德责任所需的自由。它们本身并不能证明因果决定论与自由行动是相容的。对不起。
我认为这些例子是有帮助的，因为它们是论证因果决定论与道德责任相容的第一步。

有时候我觉得一切都可能是事先注定的。你是否曾觉得某件事必须在特定的时间以特定的方式发生?如果是这样，也许一切都是注定的。在其他时候，我认为我们都有能力以任何我们想要的方式操纵我们自己和我们的环境，只要我们有足够的知识去做。我说操纵是因为我们实际上并没有创造物质或能量。目前我认为这是两者的混合。如果真有上帝，或者控制自然的上帝，我能理解为什么他会给人类自由意志，如果人类实际上拥有自由意志的话。人类制造物品，但他们没有意志，例如:汽车、房屋、街道、桥梁等。人类目前还不能制造:动物、其他人类(尽管他们有性行为)、其他有意志的生物等等，尽管他们试图通过遗传学和人工智能来做到这一点。我说，如果上帝是一个艺术家，他的艺术比现在的人类艺术更伟大。 Maybe God when he creates wanted to create a being with a Free Will that would eventually through centuries of development come to use that Will correctly-that is align itself with the Will of God. Humans seek to understand Nature, so they can uncover the laws that govern it. A collection of these laws would be equivalent to the Will of God. Y would make X and give X free will, so that eventually X would use that will perfectly. By perfectly in Y?s standard, would mean that X?s Will would align with Y?s Will, but that would take centuries of philosophical work.

Fun topic. It seems to me that all the concern about free will rides on concern about moral responsibility, which in turn rides on concern about morality in general. What I want to suggest is that even if we give up free will and moral responsibility, we can still have a viable ethics.
正如费舍尔所指出的，实践推理是向前看的，而道德责任是向后看的。道德在本质上具有前瞻性和行动指导性，因此，赋予道德责任是多余的。
此外，即使事后第三人称道德评价对伦理学至关重要，我们仍然不需要道德责任的概念。我们可以简单地说某个人在特定情况下的行为是“好”或“坏”。这对伦理来说应该足够好了。
Now, one might argue that taking moral responsibility for bad acts is necessary to develop moral attitudes like shame, and that shame (for example) is in fact a critical motivating component in practical reasoning. But there is at least one possible, aretaic response to this claim, which is to say that shame is directed at the weakness of character exposed by in committing a morally bad act, and that shame becomes action guiding by dint of one's will to reform one's character. On this understanding, then, shame is still retrospectively evaluative, but nonetheless independent of the idea of moral responsibility.
If the above sketch is on the right track, we can lose the idea of free will and (therefore) of moral responsibility without subjecting ourselves to any anxiety over whether our doing so will leave our ethics any less robust.

I can't help but think the easist way to resolve the quandry is to say there is a distinction needing to be made between ontological determinism and epistemological determinism.
Though my future actions are predetermined ontologically (or in other words, given the past and constant laws governing the unfolding of the universe) and therefore cannot be different from what they will be, there is good reason to believe what I'm choosing to call epistemological determinism (the doctrine; if you know everything about the present/past you can know the future) is unobtainable because it is impossible for a being to have such knowledge.
Putting aside the hoplessly confused notion of a theistic god, the two reasons I can see against the idea of knowledge of the present being impossible are;
1) The Heisenberg Uncertainty principle which explains that I cannot have knowledge of all causally efficacious particles as I cannot learn the velocity of a particle without changing that velocity in the course of my enquiry in an unpredictable (by me) way.
2) The present we are aware of is never the actual present of the universe but rather what one might call our causal present. To explain what I mean - say we see a supernova in the night sky; I might say "oh, how pretty" and thus it has a effect on me (if you want a more concrete effect lets say it inspires me to go on some bizarre star-hating rampage) but the actual event which is in my causal present is in fact very far in the actual past (a star a light year away appearing to go supernova means it went supernova a year ago).
这与自由意志有什么关系?虽然在一个非常真实的意义上，我的“自由意志”可能是一种幻觉，但确实存在一些貌似合理的未来，鉴于我对世界当前状态的缺乏知识，这可能是事实相关的，因为我在因果过程中有一个位置，从我的观点来看，好像我已经决定了(顺其自然)这些貌似合理的未来中的哪一个实际上会发生。
I was never very impressed by Frankfurt's paper for two reasons; (1) second-order desires do not solve the problem as second-order desires are caused by external factors just as much as first-order desires and (2) Frankfurt makes the bizarre (as I see it) claim that animals cannot have second order desires. Not only is this confusing from a natural history point of view (why would our motivation systems work completely diffently from 'animals'? Is that why we are the 'higher species'?) but it would appear to be false. To support this contention I direct your attention to rat park;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rat_Park
(It appears that rats can form desires not to desire water laced with morphine - a second-order desire - if on experience it detracts from their ability to enjoy the rat equivalent of the good life.)
By the way guys, love the show! If you're going to do more 'philosophy talk goes to the movies' spots Memento would seem to be a good candidate if you ever do a show on memory.
Duncan
Glasgow, Scotland/Cambridge, England.

Duncan,
You refer to "Frankfurt's paper," but you are obviously talking about his 1971 paper, not the 1969 paper to which I referred!
而且，我不认为法兰克福曾经说过“二阶欲望能解决问题”，或者任何“二阶欲望不能解决问题，因为二阶欲望和一阶欲望一样，都是由外部因素引起的”的回答。法兰克福对“自由行动”的描述使用了多种成分，比你想象的要复杂得多。它是否有效则是另一个问题;我同意你的怀疑。但请注意，法兰克福和他的追随者都不会错误地忽略这样一个事实:在一个因果决定论的世界里，即使是更高阶的动机状态也是由原因引起的。你的问题是:那又怎样?也就是说，这个不争的事实究竟有什么意义?

Well first of all it would seem somewhat disingenuous to me to refer to your view as 'semi-compatibilism' - as far as I was able to understand it seems your a thorough-going incompatibilist as far as the traditional account of free will ('It is the case that I could have done otherwise than I did') goes. As I understand it, we pretty much agree on how to answer the free will question (It is not the case that I could have done differently as my actions are determined by elements of the present state of the world beyond my ken but it is the case that had I been different, had some things occured to me which did not, I would have acted differently) but I'm worried you dodged the question which people have presented to me - that the view that classic 'free will' is impossible seems to conflict with feelings of resentment.
If I can ala George Bush decry someone as evil - they are the origin causa sui of their wrongdoings - then it would make sense that I can resent them, but if they arent the original cause of their wrongdoing - if it is a complicated element in a causal chain from how the world is - isn't my resentment misplaced or somehow 'false'? After all I may as well resent the past states of the world that caused their action as resent them themselves. Does this objection hold under your conception of free will? If not, why not? If it does, how would you answer it.
So far the only real answer which has occured to me is to bite the bullet and say that the concept of 'resentment' is indeed a blind-alley and that institutions which it supervenes (especially punishment) need some serious reconsideration.
Completely off-track here; are there any works you can recommend (articles, books) which have been particularly useful to you in developing your opinions on this subject?

这并不是虚伪，因为在我所有的作品中，我都非常清楚地区分了两种类型的自由或控制。另一种可能性与因果决定论不相容。
Anyway, some suggestions: Harry Frankfurt's essays on free will/moral responsibilty--he has a couple of collections on Cambridge U Press. I have been most influenced by Frankfurt. I have also been influenced by Peter Van Inwagen's An Essay on Free Will (Clarendon Press); I disagree with some of Peter's main points, but I admire this book, and I believe the arguments need to be addressed.

There is a God.
God - Consciousness
Check out this web site which is devoted to human beings open to a sober examination and response to the big questions phenomenon that has occurred since the inception of the Internet.
Off The Grid Home Page