A digital self isn’t really a person made out of numbers or fingers. It’s a computerized representation of a person. It can be a “VRS”---a virtual representation of yourself. Or a VRO --- a virtual representation of another person.

所以，重要的区别是:我们有我，真实的人。然后是对我的描述:我的名字出现在报纸上，我在镜子里的形象，我们网站上的我的图片，甚至是我脑海中我自己的想法，还有你对我的想法。

Quite apart from the digital revolutions, we all encounter many other kinds of representations of ourselves. I see my name in the phonebook, or in the Stanford catalog. I hear myself talking when I listen to Philosophy Talk on my ipod. I can see myself, or a representation, when I watch a video of my grandchild’s last birthday party. I can see an image of myself in the mirror. And in all those ways, I can also have representations of others. So now what’s special about digital representations?

一方面，考虑到今天的技术，它们可以非常逼真。如果你走进杰里米·贝伦森在斯坦福大学的虚拟现实实验室，戴上眼镜，你就能见到那些看起来和说话都很像真人的人，尽管他们实际上只是数字代表。

Another important categories of digital representations areavatars.An avatar is a representations of a real person that appears in games like “Second Life” or interacts with other avatars.

All these digital representations have something in common. They can be programmed to behave in what seems like an autonomous way, unlike a photo, or a video recording, much less like a piece of language like my name in a book. I can set up my avatar to be less responsible than I am, to live a wilder virtual life than I do in real life.

So what’s philosophical about all of virtual reality and virtual selves?

First, there is what virtual reality can tell us about belief, perception, and emotion. When you enter a virtual world voluntarily, like Bailenson’s lab, you know you’re in a plain old room, without a bottomless pit to fall into, snakes to attack you, or other people to bump into. But when you meet virtual representations, these beliefs about therealworld don’t block your emotional and physical reactions to thevirtualworld. You’re scared of stepping into the bottomless pit in the virtual room. Even though you feel the solid floor beneath your feet.

Second, it seems to hold the promise of making philosophical thought experiments come true. How do I know whether I’m Ken Taylor at the Marsh, or Ken Taylor with goggles --- maybe goggles so small I can’t feel them --- in a virtual Marsh? Descartes would love it. We could prove the existence of a virtual God ---- or at least a beneficent webmaster.

Finally, the nagging question from philosophy and science fiction: How much does reality matter? If all our experiences can be manufactured virtually, is reality that important?

On today’s program, we have the very man whose lab I mentioned, Jeremy Bailenson, Director of the Human Virtual Interaction Lab at Stanford, to help us think through some of these issues.