The Moral Lives of Animals

25 May 2016

This week our show is about The Moral Lives of Animals. We’re asking whether non-human animals could ever be moral. Can they possess moral virtues, like altruism or empathy, or act according to moral principles, like fairness or justice?

A knee-jerk response to this question might be to insist that any ascription of morality to animals is just a case of anthropomorphizing. People like to project all kinds of human traits onto animals, especially cute ones, and that’s what this is. Like most knee-jerk responses, though, this answer is not very satisfying. For a start, there are someprima faciereasons for thinking that mammals, at least, exhibit a lot of the same kind of pro-social behavior that we associate with human morality. They seem to act towards one another (and us) with empathy and loyalty. When they lose a loved-one they appear to feel grief. And what dog owner hasn’t seen that guilty expression on their pet’s face when they’ve come home to find trash all over the kitchen floor? When humans behave in these ways, we usually don’t think twice about ascribing certain emotions to them, emotions that form the basis of morality. But there’s often strong resistance when we do the same thing with non-human animals.

Granted, a misbehaving dog’s guilty expression is hardly proof that the dog has a clear sense of right and wrong in themoralsense. What we interpret as guilt might just be fear or anticipation because the dog knows that when you come home and find your slippers chewed up or trash all over the kitchen floor, you’re going to get mad and scold it. But perhaps that’s also the explanation of the guilty expression on your kid’s face when she gets caught doing something she’s not supposed to. Is there really such a huge difference? Both dogs and children seem to understand that there are things they are allowed or not allowed to do, but that’s not enough to say that they have any real morality. One would hope that the kid will eventually grow up into an autonomous adult with a clear moral compass that she is capable of reflecting upon, while your dog is probably just going to keep digging into the trash whenever the opportunity arises. So, while your misbehaving child might be quite like your misbehaving pet in terms of her grasp of morality, the difference is that the child will grow up into something with a much stronger sense of right and wrong.

The incorrigibility of your dog, however, is not a reason to dismiss the entire animal kingdom. There’s lots of evidence of animals acting against their own best interests out of a sense of fairness or altruism. Rhesus monkeys, for example, will refuse to accept food for weeks on end if that involves another monkey getting an electric shock. They’d rather starve than allow a fellow monkey to suffer. In the face of evidence like this, the knee-jerk response seems even less convincing and begins to sound merely like a prejudice. Why is the behavior of the rhesus monkey not an example of empathy (which the experimenters obviously lack, seeing as they are willing to starve and shock these poor creatures in their investigation of “altruism”)? Why would we not say the monkeys are acting from a sense of justice and fairness? And if we say that, then isn’t this an example of an animal acting for moral reasons? I’m reminded, in contrast, of the famous Milgram experiments in which subjects administered electric shocks to other subjects (or believed they were doing that) when instructed by an authority figure. Where was thehuman在这种情况下的道德?有时,我们如此相信自己的道德,却怀疑其他生物的道德,这是相当令人震惊的。引用弗拉基米尔·普京(Vladimir Putin)的话:“鼓励人们认为自己与众不同是极其危险的,无论动机是什么。”

为了解决动物是否有道德的问题,光看证据是不够的。除非我们已经确定了道德的真正含义,否则证据只能帮我们到这里。一种与康德和亚里士多德有关的哲学立场认为,为了合乎道德,我们必须能够反思我们应该采用哪些原则。除非我们拥有对自己和他人行为做出判断的认知能力,否则我们就不是真正的道德人。许多动物可能具有亲社会的本能,但如果没有能力理性地考虑自己的欲望和动机,它们就不是道德生物。虽然很明显,人类有能力进行这种理性思考,但我不清楚这在多大程度上影响了我们的实际行为。通常情况下,理性化会在之后出现,作为一种为我们所做的事情辩护或解释的方式。但是哲学家,作为一种超理性的生物,他们倾向于过分强调理性在我们日常生活中的作用。

大多数人可能只是遵循他们的道德本能,而不是花很多时间思考什么是对的或错的。如果理性真的在人类道德中扮演了如此核心的角色,那么很容易用理性的论点说服一个人他们的道德是错误的。我们都知道这种情况很少发生。哲学家在这方面可能是一个例外,但我认为哲学家也高估了他们对纯粹的、纯粹的理性(不管那是什么)的反应程度。因此,如果这种理性主义的立场是衡量道德的标准,那么大多数人也会失败。这是我对这个观点的第一个困难——它不能准确地描述人类的道德,那么我们为什么要期望它也能描述非人类的道德呢?

The second worry is that sometimes it seems being moralrequiresthat we don’t think, just act. Imagine you see a toddler wandering out into the street in front of traffic. If in that moment you stop to reflect upon your moral principles, you’re probably a big jerk. The truly moral person would just grab the child and bring them to safety without a second thought. Indeed, when people have done what others deem heroic acts, they often say that there was no choice involved. They simply perceived a situation and reacted. They are compelled, not by reason, but by instinct. And rightfully so. Sometimes, you shouldn’t have to think about it. So, I’m not persuaded by this intellectualist view of morality as it doesn’t describe how human morality is, or how it ought to be.

大卫·休谟有句名言:“理性是而且只能是激情的奴隶。”他的意思是说,理性本身永远无法激发一种行为,尽管它确实在帮助我们弄清楚如何满足我们的欲望方面发挥了重要作用。So for Hume, being moral is not simply a matter of rationally endorsing certain abstract principles, but rather of being motivated by the appropriate moralsentimentsorfeelings. However, even Hume denied that animals could be moral in anything but a rudimentary sense because they lack the cognitive sophistication humans have, which allows us to cultivate certain virtues that would not otherwise develop naturally. And for that, we need reason.

So, whichever account of morality you give—whether it be an intellectualist one or a sentimentalist one—philosophers traditionally have been in agreement that animals just don’t have what it takes to be moral.

Our guest on the show this week, Mark Rowlands, offers an alternative view in defense of the thesis that animals can be moral. While more along the lines of Hume’s sentimentalist theory than Kant’s or Aristotle’s intellectualist one, it is a novel view that rests on the distinction between a moral subject (capable of acting for moral reasons) and a moral agent (morally responsible for their actions). He claims that animals can be moral subjects but they are not moral agents.

想知道他是如何主张这个立场的,请收听我们的节目!

Comments(18)


Guest's picture

Guest

Saturday, September 14, 2013 -- 5:00 PM

Regarding dog morality, there

Regarding dog morality, there is a better example than digging in the garbage, which seems perfectly acceptable to the dog although he may know that you do not like it. If you are playing in an energetic way with your dog and he grabs your arm with his mouth hard enough to hurt and you 'yelp' in pain, most pet dogs will stop, show concern and often display 'apologetic' behavior. This is an event which he can understand.

Guest's picture

Guest

Saturday, September 14, 2013 -- 5:00 PM

Well, this just gets messier

这就越来越乱了。为什么?因为它回到了哲学和宗教之间有时很脆弱的关系。原始人类相信动物有灵魂——和有知觉的生物(如他们自己)一样重要。就这样。高等动物养育幼仔;捍卫自己的羊群;“计划”的生存和哀悼他们的死亡(有趣的是,大象是著名的悲伤机制)。你之前关于模因的文章在这里似乎是相互关联的,还有读者关于扩展表型等的评论(我是右撇子;我母亲是个左撇子; right-handedness is a dominant trait, and so on...)
It appears clear that there is some level of morality in many animals. The true question (if there is such a thing) is: do these creatures possess a soul? I would submit that if they do not, and cannot, then morality is merely a means of social control, akin to the memes Dawkins (and others?) has/have talked about. Moreover, any question of "soulness" in humankind is equally moralistic and lacking in substance. Let's see what happens...

Guest's picture

Guest

Saturday, September 14, 2013 -- 5:00 PM

Dear Mr. Taylor and Mr. Perry

Dear Mr. Taylor and Mr. Perry,
I do enjoy your show, on occasion, yet your argument today sounded half-hearted or juvenile, at best. Perhaps you are simply speaking to the lowest common denominator. More importantly, why do we humans need to think animals are or are not moral? Why would this be important, and why would this change our behavior, to be more respectful towards the animal species of the planet?
这整个问题是指道德的优越性、正义性和崇高性。既然不是所有的文化或个人都同意什么是道德,我们怎么能把这个应用到动物王国,或者也许狮子和黑猩猩有不同的道德。由于大多数道德观念源于宗教,这个问题应该是没有意义的。道德是一个社会公认的行为或行为,包括性行为,可以使这个社会变得更好。在那个社会中,不道德或有不道德行为,会给这个人带来心理上的后果,而不是身体上或有形的后果。反过来,如果一个社会成员的行为合乎道德,那么这个人就可以得到救赎。这种正在发生或应该发生在动物世界的想法是荒谬的。我们很多人都意识到,在动物世界,太多的错误,身体虚弱或不遵守文化规则说动物往往导致死亡,而不是一些精神上的痛苦。道德或良好行为可能只是一种自私的行为,或简单的数学赌博,不是吗?必须与正义或道德有关。那些互相帮助更多、更安全、平均生活水平、满意度和幸福感更高的社会。 Those societies that are greedy and less moral, have an average worse standard of life, happiness and satisfaction. This is something the animal kingdom, not humans, seems to understand and practice better than we do. If we all follow the rules and work together, we will all have a better chance at a longer, safer and healthier life. Whereas, animals seem to get this concept early; it can take a lifetime to convince a human that this might be a good idea. I can not imagine two individuals, in the animal kingdom, of the same group, having a difference of opinion on what is moral in their society, and then break off, in to another group with separate ideas of morality.
你提到了一个事实,通过道德,人类可以有遗憾,或者可以反思他们的行为。这只是因为有后果,他们可以被惩罚,尴尬或更糟,不是因为他们是道德的,他们害怕。什么样的道德规定我们应该惩罚偷吃食物的人,因为他们饿了,然后说罪犯偷东西是因为他们没有道德;然而,我们通常是他们处境的原因。这和阿尔法狗惩罚欧米茄狗在其他狗吃东西之前吃东西有什么不同。这是道德还是群体生存?他们在很小的时候就知道,在他们的社会中什么是可以接受的,什么是不可以接受的。反过来,当它们的成员遵守规则时,就会有更多的成员进食、繁殖和生存。
I have heard little mention yet, of the thousands of acts humans do, that are considered by most societies, to be totally immoral; using and starving our fellow man, torture (gassing), rape, killing for pleasure, status or greed. There has also been no admission of the many lies many humans tell for advantage, money, property or power! Many of these things are done in the name of religion and moral superiority; I don?t hear of many in the animal world doing any of these things, yet we consider ourselves to be morally superior, or simply having morals. I hardly think we are the moral majority.
Humans might like to think they are better, or rather more important, than other species by saying we are moral. As if we set the standard on, ?How to Behave? for the animal Kingdom. This is just a ruse, to convince ourselves or others, to validate our less than admirable behavior, towards ourselves, other species and the planet, usually for profit, convenience and greed. If we convince ourselves that animals do not have feeling, feel pain or sorrow, it makes it so much easier to treat them badly and not consider them a vital part of the planet, not to be squandered.
请帮助停止这些不幸的想法和想法,并帮助你的听众有一个更高的对话。比如:什么是道德,为什么我们用这个词而不是逻辑或公平?当我们对自己和地球上的其他物种造成了更多的伤害,并继续破坏我们的环境时,为什么人类总是需要觉得自己比其他物种更好、更有道德、更重要,而同时又觉得自己比其他物种优越?为什么不同的文化有不同的道德,这种道德的优点和缺点是什么?为什么不呢?难道人类不是在教导和实践这样一种道德理念:让社会上最贫穷的人生活得更好,就会让每个人的生活更安全、更有保障,包括社会上最富裕的人吗?一个怎么样?“道德”这个词是用来压制别人的吗?所有这些问题和对话将会更有趣,答案很可能会比今天更有启发性?查询。我认为今天最好的结果是什么?S的对话,会是它没有?t matter and is not necessary for animals to have human morals, for us learn, appreciate and respect all of our places in the animal kingdom.
用今天的话说?在美国的谈话中,也许我们已经变得太狂妄自大了。作为人类,我们不是一个集体社会,我们使用一个社会?S版本的道德高于另一个?S,有优越感,经常互相中伤。如果其他方法都失败了,我推荐道格拉斯·亚当斯?《宇宙漫游指南》系列。这比我听过的大多数哲学讨论更有启发性,不是吗?年代滑稽。
Sincerely,
Paula Mehoves

MJA's picture

MJA

Sunday, September 15, 2013 -- 5:00 PM

Super Goose

Super Goose
几年前的夏天,我坐在一个有一个大池塘的公园里,池塘里满是鸟、鸭和鹅,我很沮丧地看到一群野鸭试图淹死另一只野鸭。一个同类的雌性。他们一个接一个轮流把鸭子压在下面,试图杀死她。我以前见过这种行为,曾向这些鸟扔石头来阻止它们打架。但这一次,令我吃惊的是,一只大雁游了进来,一把抓住了这些冒犯我的野鸭的脖子,然后把它们扔了出去。溺水的鸭子我很高兴地说,高兴地游走了。=

Laura Maguire's picture

Laura Maguire

Sunday, September 15, 2013 -- 5:00 PM

A reply to Paula from John

A reply to Paula from John Perry:
Dear Paula,
It seemed to me that the overall thrust of the program was to show appreciation for the feeling of animals, and for the other-directed unselfish behavior of some animals. Sorry you didn't hear it that way. But thanks for listening and commenting.
JP

Harold G. Neuman's picture

Harold G. Neuman

Sunday, September 15, 2013 -- 5:00 PM

Curiouser and curiouser, said

Curiouser and curiouser, said Alice. Paula's comments were lengthy and emotional, but made some good points. MJA's rejoinder was entertaining, yet seeming improbable---I guess you had to be there-my experience as an outdoors person has shown that ducks and geese are tolerant of one another, but far from the altruism recounted. Evolution is an interesting phenomenon, and we as short-lifers, see virtually none of it. I don't mind. That's just the way things are...

Guest's picture

Guest

Sunday, September 15, 2013 -- 5:00 PM

Mark Rowlands was surely the

Mark Rowlands was surely the most evasive guest you've ever had on. I waited in vain for a concrete example of the difference between positive or negative socialbility in animals and behavior that would befit Rowlands' moral agent.

Guest's picture

Guest

Tuesday, September 17, 2013 -- 5:00 PM

Mark Rowlands was an

马克·罗兰兹(Mark Rowlands)是一位非凡的嘉宾,因为他在本应是一场至关重要的采访中,居然没有说出任何实质性的东西,结结巴巴地——当人们不理解自己的采访对象时就会这样做。人类对待动物的方式是如此可悲,以至于把这个话题归结为语义是我们无法承受的(当你不是那个付出代价的人时,这很容易做到)。说动物因为赏心悦目就应该受到保护,这简直是荒唐可笑,暴露了罗兰兹的本质——一个有妄想症的人类中心主义者。保护动物免受剥削不应该与动物的道德能力有关,而应该与我们自己的道德能力有关。请考虑让我在节目中谈论这个话题——我保证我会比罗兰兹做得更好,在这种情况下,她可耻地破坏了这一事业。

Guest's picture

Guest

Wednesday, September 18, 2013 -- 5:00 PM

Dogs dissing humans, aka

Dogs dissing humans, aka Masters????? They are are our closest non-human partners, and tearing up garbage or peeing on the rug are simply they way they let us know that we have disappointed them in our role as leader of the pack. If you think about it, it's a very human response -- ask anyone who's been on the receiving end of a belt or silent treatment.
- j

Guest's picture

Guest

Wednesday, September 18, 2013 -- 5:00 PM

I suppose a great deal

I suppose a great deal depends on whether we understand morality as a cultural, emotional, or intellectual term. I suspect that if we try to be precise we will find that we don't know what we're saying or that we're not saying anything at all, just grunting approval or disapproval.

Guest's picture

Guest

Thursday, September 19, 2013 -- 5:00 PM

I thoroughly enjoyed my

I thoroughly enjoyed my appearance on Philosophy Talk. And thank you to everyone for all these questions and comments. Here is a link to a talk I gave on this subject at the How The Lights Gets In festival of philosophy and music (yes, there is a festival of philosophy and music!) in Hay-on-Wye, Wales earlier this year.http://iai.tv/video/can-animals-be-moral
制作这段视频的艺术与思想研究所应该很快就会增加一个问答部分。
Further links that might be of interest to some can be found on my (rather neglected) blog:http://rowlands.philospot.com
@Martin Lipow ? I thought I did provide some examples, but not many because some really good ones were provided in the recorded segment before I came on the show. In any case, if it?s examples you?re after, I do mention some talk in the Hay talk.

Harold G. Neuman's picture

Harold G. Neuman

Sunday, September 22, 2013 -- 5:00 PM

Yawn.

Yawn.

Harold G. Neuman's picture

Harold G. Neuman

Thursday, May 26, 2016 -- 5:00 PM

Back in September of 2013, I

Back in September of 2013, I yawned in comment to the original post. That response was hastily conceived and there have been some developments in my own development that have altered my state of thinking on the topic. Some of those are connected with your other post concerning altered states, houligans and such like. Some are based on anecdotal accounts of unusual or unexplainable behaviors exhibited by animals toward one another or toward people. Examples seem appropriate. Item: the mother cat who adopted an orphaned squirrel, allowing it to feed with her own kittens. Item: a cat who befriended a mouse, apparently not knowing that such creatures are fodder for extermination; Item: a gorilla who protected a human infant, after the child fell into the ape's compound. These behaviors probably have nothing to do with morality. Because if your contributors/commenters are correct,animals, lacking consciousness as they MUST, also lack any capacity for, let alone appreciation of, morality.
What, then, may we make of these bizarre instances, some of which we have seen with our own eyes? Several of PT's posts have dealt with questions about morality, altruism and other such human traits and attributes. It seems clear that these have evolved over the ages of man, inasmuch as homo sapiens is a different fellow than he used to be. Evolution is bigger than how many fingers and toes we have. So, let us imagine, for just a moment, that animals can exhibit the very human behavior we characterize as altruism. Does altruism have any partnership with morality, or are they mutually exclusive? If, on the other paw, they are mutually inclusive, well, gentle readers, you may draw your own inferences. Watch out for fat men, trolleys, and mice who bully cats. Because that final scenario has also happened. The mouse (or the cat) must have been on LSD.
Neuman

Gary M Washburn's picture

Gary M Washburn

Sunday, May 29, 2016 -- 5:00 PM

What Hume meant what that the

休谟的意思是经验和理性的汇合是激情,而不是理性应该牺牲它的严格来换取激情。在《英国历史》一书中,他对“热情”大加指责。
I see a pattern in the choice of topics, unless it is nothing more than an effrort to keep the ball moving by repeating old issues, and that is a preference for speculative over analytic or scholarly themes. But the very great danger is of conceding rigor. Nothing could be more urgent of nailing down one's terms than a speculative theme. But since the object enquired of is unkown this may seem impossible, and so invites sohpomoric gestures. The answer is to be far more meticulous of the terms we can know and use them even more rigorously than the analyst.
Harry,
你使用了一些令人联想的术语,但这只会让人怀疑你的意思。你是说动物没有意识,还是说这是节目的作者说的?你是说道德行为需要隐含意义上的意识吗?在这个意义上说,动物是没有意识的)?如果是这样,你确定这是你想说的吗?你是说心灵不是物质的吗?或者动物是机械的,而人类是“精神”?如果是这样,真的吗?我觉得你该开始玩游戏了。或者也许这都是“形态共振”?

Harold G. Neuman's picture

Harold G. Neuman

Monday, May 30, 2016 -- 5:00 PM

Thanks, Gary! I'll go have a

Thanks, Gary! I'll go have a martini this evening. Beefeater, of course.
Neuman

Gary M Washburn's picture

Gary M Washburn

Tuesday, May 31, 2016 -- 5:00 PM

黑刺李,哈利。

黑刺李,哈利。

Pedestrian's picture

Pedestrian

Tuesday, May 31, 2016 -- 5:00 PM

我养的一只猫很会抓人。

我养的一只猫很会抓人。他会立刻抓我的胳膊或手,甚至偶尔……抽血。但偶尔爬上我的胸膛我们会面对面。我的猫几乎是立刻伸出爪子,就像平时挠别的地方一样快,我感觉到它柔软的皮毛碰到了眼皮上。他收回了爪子。
我的猫做了道德决定不抓我的眼睛吗?我的猫挠我眼睛的反应是良心的决定吗,知道它可能会弄瞎我的眼睛?还是说,它只是简单地认出了它的眼球,或者在爪子面前不堪一击?人们可以猜测,两者都有。道德驱使下的本能的谨慎,不去冒险伤害另一个动物的眼睛。

Gary M Washburn's picture

Gary M Washburn

Sunday, June 5, 2016 -- 5:00 PM

When Mowgli stared at the

When Mowgli stared at the wolves they turned their eyes away. When he asked why this reaction, Raksha, his "mother" replies "You are man-cub, you are wise." Do animals see in us something we do not see in them? They're not telling. But then, do we see in each other something that is not there at all? If not, why do we express opinions to others we know they do not share? And as if there were some importance in sharing them? Doesn't this suggest something unconsciously at work in what we think consciousness is? If animals are clearly trying to get something across to us, isn't this at least as interesting as what we are so clearly not getting across to each other?
Between polar opposites, or the "mutually exclusive", and logical complements, there is contrariety. In itself this is un-meaningful. But where contraries are complements in breaking the hermetic seal of polar opposition, that's where meaning and communication begins. If anything, though, its rigor is more arduous than colloquial sense and opinions, such as the opinion that we get ourselves so convicted in that we suppose, without any warrant whatever, that we ought to share. I'd like to shoot the guy who dreamt up the notion of the "self-evident"! In the realm of serious ideas nothing can be taken as "given". Even in the most basic formal signs we don't have any fundamental right to expect others to agree or even know what we mean. The miracle is not that we do, but that we recognize that we don't, and that this motivates the hard work of breaking through the logical impasse.