Responsibility and "The Actual Sequence"
John Fischer

27 March 2005

约翰·洛克提出了最早的“法兰克福式例子”。(这些例子被称为“法兰克福式的例子”,因为哈里·法兰克福在1969年的《哲学杂志》(Journal of Philosophy)上的一篇论文《替代可能性和道德责任》(Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility)中巧妙地提出了这些例子。"

这是洛克的版本。一个人睡着了,在睡着的时候,他被送进了一个房间。当他醒来时,他想离开房间,但他决定(基于他自己的原因)留在房间。他不知道房间是锁着的,因此他不可能离开房间。洛克并没有说这个人“自由地”呆在房间里,因为洛克认为自由行动意味着有做其他事情的自由。但他说,尽管他不可能离开房间,但他自愿留在了房间里。

In Locke's example, the fact that the man could not have left the room plays no role in his practical reasoning or behavior. It thus seems irrelevant to his moral responsibility. I would say that the man can be held morally responsible for staying in the room, even though he could not have left the room.

Now of course the man could have chosen to leave the room, could have tried to leave, and so forth. So (apart from any special assumptions, such as God's omniscience or causal determinism) he did in fact have SOME alternative possibilities. Harry Frankfurt seeks to expunge even these alternatives, envisaging an agent, "Black", who can control even the poor man's brain, anticipating his choices in such a way as to render it true that the man could not even have chosen or tried to do otherwise.

The "Locke/Frankfurt" examples have become a template for testing the relationship between moral responsibility and the sort of freedom or control that involves alternative possibilities. I agree with Locke and Frankfurt; in my view, one can choose and act freely, and thus exhibit the kind of control that grounds moral responsibility, without having freedom to choose or act otherwise. I have thus defended an "actual-sequence" approach to moral responsibility. But this is highly contentious. What do you think?

Comments(14)


Guest's picture

Guest

Sunday, March 27, 2005 -- 4:00 PM

I definately distinguish between unfreedoms and co

I definately distinguish between unfreedoms and constraints. A constraint is what I call something physical - like a wall, or how fast you can run. Being unable to win the Olympic sprint doesn't make you unfree - it's just another aspect of reality that constrains your options beyond mere imagination.
Unfreedom is what I call the reduction in ones options that occurs because of the will of another person. If you would like to speak your mind, but someone doesn't let you, then you don't have any freedom.
对我来说,上面的例子很清楚。那个人不能离开房间。他可以自由地呆在房间里。因此,如果他选择留在房间里,那么后果就是他的责任。如果他试图离开房间,但不能,那么后果是对话者的责任。
-Tennessee

nick's picture

nick

Sunday, March 27, 2005 -- 4:00 PM

"I would say that the man can be held morally resp

“我会说,这个人应该为留在房间里承担道德责任,尽管他不可能离开房间。”——我不同意。也许这是我对这个困境的看法。根据这个例子,这个人不能离开这个房间。当然,他可以试试,但他的尝试是徒劳的,门打不开,因为它是锁着的。因此,他别无选择,只能呆在房间里。我不认为他选择留在房间仅仅是因为他不能离开。在这种情况下没有选择,没有自由意志。
I may be mistaken here, but I don't think so. Am I setting up a fallacy of false alternatives (false dilemma) if I see the man is either in the room or out of the room? His choice, his free will is not present if the door is locked. It constraints his ability to choose one OR the other. Tennessee agreed with your statement when he said "He is free to stay in the room. Thus, if he chooses to stay in the room, then the consequences are his responsibility." It's like holding a ball in your hand and hanging your arm out in front of you: you have two choices, (a) continue holding the ball in your hand, or (b) drop the ball to the ground. There is no third option, it's a clear cut two-option situation. Except, like the man in the locked room example, suppose that the ball is glued to the man's hand. If your statements about this man in the room example are true, then so would saying this about the ball in hand example: because the ball is glued to his hand, he has chosen to continue holding it..... Similar, or no?

Guest's picture

Guest

Sunday, March 27, 2005 -- 4:00 PM

The only way a person can be a slave is through al

The only way a person can be a slave is through allowing their will to be enslaved
There are too many absolute statements. Just because the door was locked does not mean he could not have left the room. The only way a person can be made a slave is through their own will, which allows itself to be coerced. The slave allows himself to be a slave through their own will. Hegel stated that ?As a living thing man may be coerced, i.e. his body or anything else external about him may be brought under the power of others; but the free will cannot be coerced at all, except in so far as it fails to withdraw itself out of the external object in which it is held fast, or rather out of its idea of that object. Only the will which allows itself to be coerced can in any way be coerced (Hegel-Philosophy of Right).? The man could have altered the form of the door or walls through various means and tools present in the room. When describing that the room was locked, and he could not have left the room, you are taking an absolute position similar to God-but only God would know that the man absolutely cannot get out/there is no other wise. You have not even described the room, or how what the locking mechanism is, and yet you jumped to the fact that he can?t get out. All physical doors are finite, that means there is a way to get out; it has a flaw in its being finite. Locke was made fairly good contributions to epistemology, but they were greatly superceded by those that came after.
For further a further explanation on how the man could be able to get out of the room through Possession of the lock consult Hegel?s Philosophy of Right.
?Based on his own Reasons he decided to stay in the Room?
Most people before deciding they want to stay in the room would want to find out if they could get out. Kant wanted to know if there are limits to Reason, concerning such question as God, Immortality of Soul, and Freedom.

nick's picture

nick

Sunday, March 27, 2005 -- 4:00 PM

Ok, Homer, so there's lots of neat, tricky ways to

Ok, Homer, so there's lots of neat, tricky ways to figure your way out of the room (picking the lock, pushing the door really hard, or having the man physically transubstantiate into a liquid in order to pass under the door like Terminator II).
这些都很好,但为了讨论的目的,假设真的没有办法走出那个房间。假设这是绝对不可能的,除非房间外面的人(比方说从外面)打开门,否则他根本不可能出去。现在的问题是:他是“选择”留在房间里吗?(请跟我来)他不可能逃出这不可逃离的房间,他是否有责任留在屋内?
My answer: no, he should not be held responsible because he cannot get out. Choice requires alternatives (there are none in this case) and so does morality.

Guest's picture

Guest

Sunday, March 27, 2005 -- 4:00 PM

?Those are all nice and great, but for the sake

?Those are all nice and great, but for the sake of argument suppose that there REALLY is NO way to get out of that room. Suppose that it is absolutely impossible, there is no way in hell that he's getting out until someone else outside of the room unlocks the door (from the outside, let's say).?
让吗?S说这个抽象的问题确实存在于现实世界中。让我们说,我们中的一个人扮演上帝的角色,这是完全荒谬的,一个人不能无限地想象上帝的存在或感动整个大自然的东西。让吗?有人说云其实是棉花糖。比如说我们听别人说话?这个问题包含在他的《神学概论》中,所以很明显,男人应该呆在房间里,因为他可以?don’不要违反规则。
You are giving into another person?s absolute ideas to easily. The person who wrote this problem knows how to use words as chains. Now if this is just a game that is OK, but if you plan to build some kind of morality and ethics out of this Logic, it is absurd. You say that ?until someone else outside of the room unlocks the door,? then that guy has an option of convincing the guy to open the door for him-therefore he has a way to get out.
There is no such thing as an inescapable room in the real world. If there is a Lock, there is always someone who knows how to pick it. You are always in control of your Will, and just because you can?t think of an alternative does not mean that it does not exist. That is why you constantly need to increase your Education (collection of principles) and sharpen your judgment, so that you can perceive and use alternatives. Anyone who tells you that there are no alternatives is seeking to manipulate you into their slave.
What about the whole idea of making ?no choice? is a choice within itself? I choose not to choose.

Guest's picture

Guest

Monday, March 28, 2005 -- 4:00 PM

I think that the "Locke/Frankfurt Examples" provid

I think that the "Locke/Frankfurt Examples" provide us with intuitions that the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (which itself is supposed to be intuitive) may too strong or even completely wrong. I think that PAP comes from our intuition that when someone is forced to do something against their will then they can't be held responsible for it. It seems that this sort of intuition was the basis for PAP, which in my opinion completely misinterpreted that intuition. It seems that responsibility becomes an issue of will not choice, therefore making alternate possibilities irrelevant.

nick's picture

nick

Monday, March 28, 2005 -- 4:00 PM

Homer, I don't see why you just can't take the hyp

侯默,我不明白你为什么不能接受这个假设(为了便于讨论,就假设这个男人真的出不了房间)。但不管。
Jamie, I agree that the example seems to hint at the intuitive belief about PAP, as you said (Principle of Alternative Possibilities), but not necessarily that this belief is "too strong or even completely wrong."
但你说了些有趣的话,我记下来了。“似乎责任,”你说,“变成了一个不愿选择的问题……”我认为你暗示了WILL和CHOICE之间的区别。这是一个很好的区分,我之前没有想到。可以有一个没有意愿的选择,当然也可以有一个没有选择的意愿;或者它们可以对应。是的,责任更多地取决于一个人的意愿,而不是选择。但假设有这样一种情况,一个人有意志但没有选择,例如上图房间里的那个人。在我看来,他肯定有留在房间里的意愿,而且他会按照自己的意愿行事。然而,他别无选择,只能呆在房间里,因为房间是锁着的。 I still don't see him as being responsible for staying in the room, even if it is his will. Saying otherwise takes for granted the fact that, in the example, the man was not aware of the fact that the door was, in fact, locked. He had no knowledge of that fact. Had he known this or not know this, he would not be responsible for "staying" in the room. After all, either way, he could not leave.
是啊,我猜我的直觉认为是PAP。责任部分可能取决于意志和选择的混合,而不是简单地将前者视为专属领域。

Guest's picture

Guest

Monday, March 28, 2005 -- 4:00 PM

?I think that PAP comes from our intuition that

?I think that PAP comes from our intuition that when someone is forced to do something against their will then they can't be held responsible for it. It seems that this sort of intuition was the basis for PAP, which in my opinion completely misinterpreted that intuition. It seems that responsibility becomes an issue of will not choice, therefore making alternate possibilities irrelevant,? said Jamie.
你是指一个人(X)拿枪指着另一个人?s (Y)的头,并强迫他做什么?在这种情况下,我可能会同意,(Y)没有其他选择,这个人(Y)不能为他们的行为负责,因为他们的生命马上受到威胁。但我不会屈服于洛克的抽象问题。他的抽象问题在现实世界中是站不住脚的,它太过绝对,要求一个玩家扮演上帝的角色。如果你想从你的逻辑(比如这个问题)中创造一种道德或伦理,它必须适用于现实世界。当然,我们可以玩一些抽象的游戏(充满空洞的概念),然后从中创造出一些抽象的道德,但结局是多余的。假设,假设,诸如此类的词都是在浪费时间。我们在寻找真理。停止玩弄空洞的概念,开始使用符合经验条件的概念。

Guest's picture

Guest

Monday, March 28, 2005 -- 4:00 PM

Nick, The fact that we are unaware doesn't seem

Nick,
The fact that we are unaware doesn't seem to limit our responsibility. If that was the case then ignorance would negate responsibility. For example, If I am driving down the road and am unaware (or even ignorant) of the speed limit signs (which are in plain sight), then according to your statement I am not responsible for speeding when I get pulled over. Or perhaps I am unaware of the child playing the street and I hit him with my SUV. Is it the case that I not responsible for hitting the child and possibly killing him.
Homer,
I am curious to the statement about one of the players playing the role of God. I don't see this as the case. There is a person in a locked room and ultimately all the needs to be is one player. What if the person in Locke's example voluntarily walked into a room and shut the door himself, unbenounced to him however once the door was shut it was impossible to open it. In this case there is only one person involved in the example. There is no one playing the role of god in this instance is there?
How are terms like suppose, assume,... wastes of time? These types of words help us to come to an understanding that makes the truth more meaningful. Is Einstein theory of Special Relativity a waste of time because its assumptions about gravity? In logic, when arguing reductio ad absurdum, we assume the opposite of what we think the conclusion is in order to show that the truth of the matter is that the assumption is not the case (hopefully).

Guest's picture

Guest

Monday, March 28, 2005 -- 4:00 PM

In third sentence of the second paragraph it shoul

In third sentence of the second paragraph it should say "ultimately all THERE needs to be ..." sorry

nick's picture

nick

Monday, March 28, 2005 -- 4:00 PM

Jamie: Oh no. That isn't my position. I feel that

Jamie: Oh no. That isn't my position. I feel that awareness is strongly tied to responsiblity, and vice versa, that unawareness is tied to un-responsibility. As a general statement, that is my view.
This kind of viewpoint rests on (what I would call) a sliding horizontal scale, however. Go with me here, see if you get where I'm going. On the left end is full awareness; on the other is total unawareness, no knowledge whatsoever--in any way, including pre-knowledge, any "general idea," or hint, or clue, or whatever inkling of potential knowledge whatsoever at all. The left side (full awareness) includes characteristics like full consciousness, ability to use senses and interpret bodily data, employ reason, and so on. On the right side of my scale is the area of no knowledge, again no ability to detect or sense or take in any mental fact (say, like a person in a comatose state or whatever).
The idea of responsiblity corresponds and, you could say, lays on this scale from left to right also. If you're on the Left and fully conscious (i.e. nothing hinders your ability to take in the facts and make a conscious, rational, reasonable decision), then you are responsible to the greatest extent [which isn't to say fully, completely responsible, but responible enough to suffer punishment for not making the right decision]. If you're on the Right then you're not conscious, not awake, not "there" in the mind enough to make rational, reasonable decisions based on the given alternatives.
Now, a couple of caveats. Somewhere on this sliding scale there is negligence. That is to say, at some point on this scale (somewhere between the far left and far right), there is a level of knowledge sufficient to inform the agent that his act is possible to produce a certain (and perhapsd undesirable) consequence. Legitimate negligence is punishable and therefore subject to the requirements of responsibility, in my view. WHERE negligence exists on the scale is what we have to debate and decide, but it is somewhere along that line. Here's my diagram:
[L]_____a________N__________t___________c____[R]
L = far left side of scale, most responsible
a = normal functioning adult, responsible
N = negligent agent, not totally informed but had enough prior knowledge
t = teenager, somewhat responsible
c = child, not too responsible yet
R = far right side of scale, no responsibilty because no knowledge
Do you see where I'm going with this? I think that you're example about driving along a road and hitting some child unbeknownst to me as I drive, is a bad example. If I am able to drive, then I have been given a license (you didn't specify in the hypothetical) so I just assumed. Therefore, I have the KNOWLEDGE of my duty to watch the road and my path as I drive. I am equipped with sufficient KNOWLEDGE to operate a vehicle, and to be reasonable informed of its weight, mass, etc., and how dangerous it is if objects get in my way. With these things in mind, the driver of the vehicle that hits the child is responsible for hitting the child. It may be negligence, it may be outright wrongdoing, but it his still the driver's fault. This driver, to use my diagram, this driver's responsibility level will have to correspond to his knowledge level. Maybe somewhere between "t" and "a".

Guest's picture

Guest

Monday, March 28, 2005 -- 4:00 PM

To Nick, ?Where Negligence Exists=X? Cle

To Nick,
?Where Negligence Exists=X?
Clearly teenagers, people under the age of 18, should not be held as responsible as people over 18. That is why 17 year olds can?t buy automobiles. The ?Where Negligence Exists=X? would either have to be (X=a), or (a>X>n). This could be used to judge people without disability. Now the question is where would a ?mentally disabled? person be on the scale? And how do assign responsibility to them? Do mentally disabled people drive cars legally?
Clearly X is not something as high as Kant's categorical imperative. Are you trying to construct something universal, or a standard based on the "every man?" How are you trying to construct this standard? What would you use Nick?
Jamie: Ignorance is no excuse, and it is not bliss.

nick's picture

nick

Tuesday, March 29, 2005 -- 4:00 PM

Homer, yes I agree that negligence would be somewh

侯默,是的,我同意过失应该在(a)和(t)之间,这就是为什么我把它放在(N)之间,在上图中。过失是一个棘手的概念,因为要追究责任,代理人必须有足够的信息和义务知识,知道他必须,实际上,履行义务,但他没有。在这种情况下,知识的水平显然与责任的水平有关。
If you still insist that there isn't a clear tie between the level of knowledge and the level of responsibility, I would cite for you as evidence the legal system. Not that the legal system is the best evidence for any proposition, but it does show the way we currently practice criminal justice. Notice how there an accused isn't just convicted of "murder," rather they are charged with either capital, first degree, second degree, or manslaughter murder. (I'm not sure of any other categories of murder.)
With each charge, there are a specific set of circumstances that must be met to convict the accused. These circumstances include how much the murderer knew and planned and intended at the time of the alleged murder. This information will determine whether he/she be accused of capital, first, second, or manslaughter. And subsequently, there are varying levels of punishment that can be doled out by a jury in these four kinds of cases. Obviously, capital murder carries with it the greatest possible punishment (death penalty), while manslaughter punishment is not so severe (two years to life, I suppose--but not the death penalty).
这里的要点是,在实践中,我们已经尝试将责任/惩罚与一个明显的不法分子在事件发生时的知识水平相匹配。这才是道德上正确的做法。如果一个人做了一件他根本不知道自己做错了的事,或者他得到的信息是错误的,那么对他进行超过应得的惩罚是不公平的。

Guest's picture

Guest

Saturday, June 2, 2007 -- 5:00 PM

I think I understand the premise of this hypotheti

I think I understand the premise of this hypothetical well enough: according to Locke, the man was not free in his action, yet he ought to be held morally responsible for his decision to stay in the room. Putting the issue of the man's freedom aside for a moment, it seems to me that Locke?s version of the ?Frankfurt-type example? is terribly incomplete. Here are my concerns:
First, what exactly are the repercussions of the man?s actions? Why is he being held morally responsible for choosing to stay in the room? This isn?t explained, yet it seems vital to the example.
More importantly: If I understand the example, the man simply awakes in a room, mulls things over, and decides to stay ? at which point he becomes morally responsible for his actions. How can we reasonably hold him morally responsible? Shouldn't he have been notified beforehand of the consequences his actions held? At what point does moral responsibility enter into the equation?