I don't think the Founders failed on either front.
1. Washington -- the first President, rejected becoming King and self-limited his term of service. He was a Founder, and he set the example! The Ninth and Tenth Amendments, too, limit federal power (and thus the President) by leaving unenumerated rights to the people to decide in their state legislatures. And Article III prevents the President from firing the judges at-will and Congress from reducing their salaries if they dislike a decision (e.g., one limiting their powers). And the President must stand for national election -- far harder to do than to be elected to the Senate by a state legislature (under the un-amended Constitution), i.e., mere charisma won't do. So it simply isn't true that the Founders failed to understand an executive could be so charismatic that the people would be tempted to magnify his power. They specifically put in provisions that prevented the exercise of imperial power by a President!
2.政党与国父们的派系概念完美契合。你似乎认为一个政党的思想是一致的，党派成员都有一个共同的议程。不是这样的。每个政党都是由各种竞争派系组成的联盟，这就是为什么每届政府都是不同的。即使是同一政党的历届政府也会有所不同。外国的议会制度只是表明了这种联盟的建立，因为每个派系都作为自己的政党运行。但不同的政党联合起来形成多数或少数联盟，就像我们这里的非议会制度中有多数或少数政党一样。这里的不同之处在于，我们有一个赢家通吃的制度，它平等地尊重小州和大州，把边缘政党排除在外。纳德拉派、绿党、自由意志主义者和马克思主义者没有机会进入国会(尽管他们可能会破坏选举)。 The best shot they have is getting their most popular ideas stolen by one of the major parties. Which is good. It leads to the best ideas being a part of representative democracy, not the fringe ones. It mirrors our belief in self-governance and the market place of ideas. So what you see as partisanship is really just what the Founders described in Federalist Papers Nos. 10 and 51 and what they meant to include in the First Amendment by protecting our rights of association and to lobby.
然而，你会发现我们的制度带来的政治结果存在实质性缺陷。考虑到美国公民竞选公职的相对自由，以及你在广播节目中的霸道讲坛和精英学术机构的终身职位，也许你应该竞选公职。问题可能在于美国财富的受过教育的受益者的冷漠，而不是由我们的建国文件构成的政府结构。

IS the problem, rather.
Should have used preview.

关于三权分立的绝对性，以及历史上和现代规避三权分立的案例，似乎引起了很多争论。虽然我们不认为三权分立在任何方面都是不必要的，但我们确实认为，即使是开国元勋们也不相信完全和完全地遵守三权分立。这一论点的一个很好的例子可以直接在宪法中找到，在宪法中，制宪者在最高法院的绝对权力方面放置了一种明显的紧张关系。第3条第1款写道:“美国的司法权，应授予一个最高法院……”，这表明司法权属于法院，法院将裁决美国宪法下发生的所有法律案件。然而，第3条第2款规定:“……最高法院对法律和事实有上诉管辖权，但有例外情况，并有国会制定的规定。”因此，国会可以为最高法院审理的具有上诉管辖权的案件创造例外!在同一篇文章中，美国的司法权完全属于法院!因此，似乎有一些隐藏的紧张情况开国元勋们给了我们绕开完全的权力分立的方法。因此，我们认为，虽然现在不是到处宣告三权分立结束的好时候，但现在是不要到处担心三权分立每次被打破的时候。 So far, nothing drastic has befallen the US due to some of these trends away from the ideal, and it is arguable that the founders themselves provisioned us for turns away from complete seperation.
This comment written by students of Mr. Koepping's AP Government class, circa 2006, period 8.

The discussion starts with a debate of the separation of powers and what that entails. The inherently more interesting question, however, becomes what is the role of the president, specifically dealing with his role of ?commander in chief?, and when does this power apply.
尽管行政部门是制宪会议期间讨论最彻底的问题，也是解释最模糊的条款之一，但总统的权力没有像司法和立法部门那样明确地列举出来。
制宪者给总统贴上“总司令”的标签，是想让他拥有怎样的权力?武装部队?我觉得在这种情况下，总统多次超越了他作为武装部队指挥官的权利，要清楚地解释这些是多余的，我觉得凯瑟琳·沙利文女士的观点准确地描述了这一点。就像她说的，行政权力是统帅?不让他控制国家的武装力量，也不让他掌握指挥人民意志的权力。在美利坚合众国宪法中很明显，立宪者不会支持他在近期事务中的决定。制宪者对君主制的恐惧超过了其他任何东西，他们采取了非常极端的措施来确保我们的国家摆脱它。
In areas such as the wire tapping, where it is clearly an invasion of citizens rights, congress should have stepped in and put an immediate end to it. Due to ?unhealthy partisanship?, however, the legislature allowed these unlawful to operations to continue. The members of congress feel more strongly bound to the views of the party, rather than the positions they hold and the responsibilities they have, not only to the American people, but are bound to by the American Constitution. Brilliant. If that does not show the grave danger to separation of power and checks and balances, nothing ever will.
关于自然状态的最后一个警告:这有点像中学，但他们可以杀死你。那不遵纪守法的民主国家又该何去何从?我不记得在小学偷过男朋友，骂过难听的名字，还有什么比初中更糟糕的呢?
Written by a member of Mr. Keopping's 7th period AP Government class at Lake Oswego High School

我想为我们的宪法提出一个来自古希腊哲学的三权分立的原型。
The Stoics divided philosophy into three areas: logic, physics, and ethics. Recall that for the Greeks, and especially for the Stoics, philosophy was considered to be a wisdom-practice, or what the historian Pierre Hadot calls a "spiritual practice." This meant that ideally philosophy was something to which one committed one's life, living the pursuit of wisdom -- sophia -- which one embodied in one's very being. So philosophy was a first-person endeavor, in which one applied oneself to living in a certain way, guided by one's love of wisdom. "To live in accordance with nature," as the Stoics put it.
From this first-person perspective, the three divisions of philosophy stand out as having special significance. The psyche or soul itself has a three-fold function. It functions as a faculty of knowledge, which correlates with logic and epistemology. It also functions as a faculty of efficient causation, which correlates with ethics. Finally, it functions as a faculty of final causation, because our action is purposive, and this correlates with physics and the study of nature. In brief, the idea was that the study of logic improved one's faculty of knowledge, the study of physics improved one's faculty of final cause, and the study of ethics improved one's faculty of efficient cause.
Now, our constitution's separation of powers, I suggest, correlates with this Stoic division of philosophy and with the three faculties of the psyche. The judiciary correlates with the psyche's faculty of knowledge and the study of logic. The legislative correlates with the psyche's faculty of final causation and the study of physics. The executive correlates with the psyche's faculty of efficient causation and the study of ethics.
If my suggestion is correct, then it directly follows that any conception of the executive as the faculty of final causation is simply false. This function falls to the legislative, NOT the executive. The legislative carries out this function of final causation by passing law. The executive carries out the function of efficient causation by putting the law into effect.
我的建议与一个有魅力的总统的问题有什么关系?一方面，它为我们提供了一个区别，有魅力的总统执行他/她的适当功能(即，有效因果关系)，和有魅力的总统没有执行他/她的适当功能，而是试图执行一个不同的政府部门的功能。魅力本身并不是一件坏事，只要它是在一个分支的范围内的魅力。但当这种魅力延伸到篡夺政府其他部门的职能时，我们就有麻烦了。
Right now, our president appears to be usurping the functions of both the judiciary and the legislative. His refusal to seek judiciary permission for warrantless searches and surveillance, and his substitution of courts controlled by the judiciary by courts controlled by the executive (e.g. military courts) represent, I believe, serious usurpation of the function of the judiciary, which is to evaluate knowledge claims and judge whether or not they meet standards of evidence. And, his outright refusal to obey the law passed by Congress, but instead to claim that his alleged "war powers" allow him to cherry-pick which laws he obeys, represents a serious usurpation of the function of the legislative branch, which is to evaluate possible goals for government action and choose which to pursue.
What lies at the end of this potential slippery slope of executive usurpation of function? The consolidation of all three functions of government into one single omnipotent branch. And this seems to me to be as good a definition as any of tyranny.
I would flesh this argument out further, but I don't have the time or resources right now. So I'm just putting it out there for readers' interest.
Cheers,
-paul

The link to KALW radio didn't work (for me at least). Luckily, Googling "KALW radio" worked just fine. Glad to see your show is still on the air.

Ken's analysis of the intent of the constitution's framers derives from tyranny-prevention by checking executive power against legislative, and vice versa. In this it is seriously flawed, because, as he points out, the judiciary is left out, and the possible subject of potential tyranny is highly partial. It's well known, for example, that a main cause of the Revolutionary War was the level of prohibition by the Crown of colonial expropriation of native territory. In the final draft of the constitution, native inhabitants of expropriated land had to be included by the term "all others", in the provision in article 1 which insured landed control of the political process by afforded 3/5th's human-status to enslaved individuals for electoral purposes. So the goal of the framers is very far from tyranny prevention. Rather, as evidenced by subsequent events, the goal was, and in many respects continues to be, tyranny selectiveness.

Monotheism developed almost in contradistinction from the more usual polytheistic deities of ancient times. Perhaps it's the ulitmate political incorrectness to suggest that monarchies and then the U. S. presidency are corollaries of Monotheism. The U.S. presidencey is lately more and more defined in religious terms to such extent that in the most recent turn of political events, religious "values" have been made essentially the only qualification for presidency in what amounts to a mockery of any other qualifications.

我知道为什么。她非常聪明，善于表达，对宪法有很深的了解。很高兴她能成为我们的客人。

I think the key element here is that our Constitution is Newtonian in theory and Darwinian in practice. From the start, ours was meant to be something of a gravity-defying system of three independent spheres keeping each other up in the air. Much like the laws of physics, each Article carries a rather absolute view of their respective roles and given to a frustratingly inert movement of (radical) action. This is good for a democracy, but a threat to individual liberty as there are no explicit safeguards.
Enter Darwin and the Bill of Rights, and in particular the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. Through its prism we actually live and see our great text. Because the 14th Amendment makes it clear that all individuals born in the US shall not be deprived "of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," it preserves individual rights, and thus the civil rights of minorities. (Majority Rule and Minority Rights)
这使得宪法最终会随着时间的推移而演变，因为我们有保障的保护带来了对公民权利迅速执行的期望(关于:布朗诉教育委员会案;亚特兰大汽车旅馆之心诉卡岑巴赫案;Loving v. Virginia等)。我认为，我们的国家从吉姆·克劳到巴拉克·奥巴马，这是合乎情理的，因为从宪法无视公民自由和权利到在一个世纪的时间里全面执行这些权利，这是一种进化模式。大多数国家只能梦想这样的转变;我们的——我们是美利坚合众国是有原因的。
In the case of the 1950's, it was the Supreme Court that first recognized civil rights, but ultimately, the Executive and then the Legislature, took decisive up the cause from there, and the rest, as they say, is history. When in concert, the branches are a check, but they can also be a weather vain on where the country is on any given issue, sort of like a scout. I am not so Congress or a president ever likes to be ahead of any issue without political cover.
XXX
As to the role of the charismatic leader, I would strongly challenge the point, Dr. Taylor. George Washington was America's first action hero and the quintessential charismatic leader. He was, after all, offered the opportunity to be dictator-for-life, but squashed that idea in its tracks.
If you look at the Constitution, you will find that the president has only the power to nominate and the power to veto. Yes, he can negotiate treaties, but here, as with his nominations, he needs the approval of the US Senate. But what he has above all else is his bully pulpit, and as history has shown, a President can achieve quite a bit with such power (FDR, TR, JFK, Reagan, Clinton, and even [awkwardly] G.W. Bush).
Washington got what he wanted through his force of personality, and ever since, each president has set themselves in that tradition, most notably in the 19th Century, Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln, and the 20th, TR, Wilson, FDR, JFK, LBJ, Reagan, and Clinton.
This century, I predict President Obama to follow suit. If his race speech is any hint, I think we're in for quite an impressive catalog of great words matched with an even stronger impact.
因此，与国会、法院和总统的许多职能一样，总统已经演变成一个远比(部分)制宪者想象的更丰富、更强大的机构，但假设他们没有考虑到这一点，是完全虚假的。当时的美国人和现在一样，需要力量。他们想要一个在必要时大胆，在可能时谨慎的领导人。他们想要一个没有血统的君主，一个监督严格的独裁者，一个由我们的法治统治的政治家。
奇怪的是，这听起来更像托马斯·霍布斯，而不是约翰·洛克!
NS

哦，我差点忘了!如果你认为国会缺乏勇气保护他们的特权，你只需要看看历史。就在3年前，尽管布什总统在连任选举中取得了重大胜利，众议院和参议院扩大了规模，但他的社会保障政策还是崩溃了。罗斯福在法院包装计划上做得过头了，因此，他的国内议程几乎停止了。他再也无法通过任何重大的新政计划，直到第二次世界大战之前他都没有这么强大。国会——很像法院——由于其制度性质而行动迟缓，它不是要对总统的每一个举动做出反应，而是要控制行政权力的过度。这同样适用于今天、昨天和明天的任何一位总统!
The office is not charismatic--objects cannot bring charisma, but the leader's persona. Few have had much impact that did not have charismatic integrity. Sorry, Dr. Taylor, but you're misguided to believe otherwise. The office was meant to create a mystique on which to govern. For some, it has worked but for most, it has failed.
I could go on, but I've proven my poli sci skills long enough. The show is great. Keep up the GREAT work!
NS

在我看来，创始人?甚至是三权分立的发明者孟德斯鸠?他不仅对总统的魅力和党派忠诚的重要性缺乏先见之明，而且对第三个“大事实”也缺乏先见之明:“第五力量”的发展，即电视(在奥威尔的第四种力量:媒体之后)。电视对伊拉克战争的报道一直是使人们相信这场战争是正确的主要方式。与其他媒体相比，电视可以根据人们观看的内容向不同的方向发展。第五种力量在驱动人们的注意力和兴趣方面是压倒性的。在媒体直接归政治家所有的国家，权力分立本身似乎处于危险之中:在意大利，总理西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼拥有三个主要的私人频道，并对其他三个公共频道有很大的影响力;泰国总理他信·西那瓦(Thaksin Shinawatra)在2006年的军事政变中被罢黜之前，拥有电信、媒体和电子商务的主要公司。互联网连接可能在上次美国大选中发挥了重要作用，它可能在一定程度上抵消“大媒体”的影响。但是，说到三权分立，就应该关注主要电视频道的议程，关注大量“有魅力”的人物，这些人物作为政治领袖在视觉媒体上无处不在(不仅仅是总统的魅力本质)。

Limited Government In Relation to Some Fields of Power Prohibited to the Federal Government
The Constitution's enumeration of powers granted to the Federal government is summed up by Madison in The Federalist number 45, as we have seen, as being: ". . . few and defined . . . will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negociation, and foreign commerce . . ." It is of interest to note briefly some principal examples of fields of power which are prohibited to the Federal government by the Constitution, as amended to the present writing.
In The Federalist number 17, Hamilton decried the idea that the new Federal government--to be created under the Constitution, then in process of ratification--would not respect the strict limits on its powers as prescribed in this fundamental law but would usurp the reserved powers of the States; as was being asserted by those who were extremely fearful of any central government with substantial powers and were arguing in favor of stricter and clearer limits on Federal power. Chief among these were Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee and Samuel Adams. Hamilton here mentioned commerce, finance, negotiation, and war as being the principal fields of power properly delegated to the Federal government but he expressly made it clear that agriculture is excluded. He classified agriculture as a field belonging to the reserved powers of the States--as one which could never properly be under the control of the central government:
"The administration of private justice between the citizens of the same state, the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature, all those things in short which are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desireable cares of a general jurisdiction."
By "general jurisdiction" he meant the Federal government. The field of agriculture was no doubt chosen by Hamilton for specific mention here because it was common knowledge--not only among those who had framed the Constitution but among all other leaders as well as the people at large---that nothing would have been considered more unarguably and absurdly false than any claim that the activities of people engaged in agriculture would be subject to Federal regulation or control, directly or indirectly, under the Constitution's wording as understood by The Framers and Adopters and everyone else.
Several other illustrations of prohibited power were provided by President Jefferson in his Second Inaugural Address. He discussed the constructive uses of any possible surplus revenues of the Federal government and mentioned some which he stated are outside of the scope of power of this government under the Constitution, expressly noting that an amendment of the fundamental law would be necessary before such use could be made of any surplus of tax monies:
". . . by a just repartition among the states, and a corresponding amendment of the constitution, be applied, in time of peace, to rivers, canals, roads, arts, manufactures, education, and other great objects within each state." (Emphasis added, except "in time of peace" emphasized in the original.)
换句话说，联邦政府用于这些特定目的的开支没有得到宪法的授权——这些活动领域被排除在宪法规定的联邦政府权力范围之外;因此，有必要通过一项修正案，通过人民适当表达的同意，给予任何此类支出必要的制裁。In his sixth annual Message to the Congress in 1806, Jefferson again discussed possible surplus revenues and their use in such fields requiring a constitutional amendment:
". . . application to the great purposes of the public education, roads, rivers, canals, and such other objects of public improvement as it may be thought proper to add to the constitutional enumeration of federal powers . . . I suppose an amendment to the constitution, by consent of the States, necessary, because the objects now recommended are not among those enumerated in the constitution, and to which it permits the public moneys to be applied." (Emphasis added.)
特别有趣的是，杰斐逊在这里明确区分了使用联邦资金援助教育(特别提到国家科学学习机构)——他指出，除非通过宪法修正案授权，否则这是未经授权的;另一方面，通过从联邦政府(通过占领、购买或征服印第安人和外国政府)已经拥有的大量未开垦和未定居的土地中拨出土地来资助教育，他说，国会“现在有权力”使用这些土地。2022世界杯小组赛分组联邦政府给予土地的这种教育援助已经成为惯例;它是在邦联下开始的，通常被认为是在宪法下联邦政府的权力范围内——但联邦国库中的税收却不是这样。
Special emphasis is needed with regard to the basis of this distinction between such Federal land-grants and money-grants, as to constitutionality: the Federal government has the power to dispose of land and other property it owns (Art. IV, Sec. 3) and, furthermore, single-transaction land-grants could not possibly accomplish the unconstitutional objective of permitting it to obtain, in effect, any control over the recipients. On the other hand, the Constitution did not specify aid to education as one of the purposes for which the Federal government (specifically the Congress) might tax and spend; and furthermore periodic, or regular, grants of money could not but have the practical effect of giving this government--perhaps indirectly, gradually and subtly but nevertheless inescapably--substantially controlling influence over the recipient institutions, or persons. This is due partly to the reason cited by Hamilton in The Federalist number 79: "In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will." (Emphasis Hamilton's.) In other words, "he who pays the piper calls the tune." Such control can even be effectively manifested negatively, by creating inhibitions on the part of the recipient of the subsidy or grant of funds, rather than through control affirmatively and outrightly. For example, those who would hope for a Federal grant in the future--such as a scholar, or a college--would be strongly inclined to refrain from criticism of this government regarding things which would otherwise be freely and vigorously condemned as unsound.
这就是为什么汉密尔顿在1791年担任财政部长时，谨慎地限制自己的论点，以排除联邦政府的控制，当他第一次支持这样一种观点时，即税收条款赋予联邦政府在服务于公众福利的范围内“使用资金”的独立和实质性权力。他还在另一份文件中表示，它不会“……imply a power to do whatever else should appear to Congress conducive to the general welfare" and continued:
"A power to appropriate money with this latitude, which is granted, too, in express terms, would not carry a power to do any other thing not authorized in the Constitution, either expressly or by fair implication." (1791 "Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States"; and 1791 Report on "Manufactures.")
The Taxing Clause, using the words "general Welfare," (Art. I, Sec. 8) states: "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . ."
Hamilton always denied that this clause gives Congress a general legislative authority--to legislate regarding, and so as to achieve, whatever Congress might consider to be for the common good. He never varied from his assertion in The Federalist number 83, regarding the plan of the Framing Convention expressed in the Constitution, with regard to such authority, as follows:
“公约的计划宣布，国会的权力或换句话说，国家立法机关的权力应扩大到某些列举的情况。这种对细节的规定显然排除了一切自命为一般立法机关的人;因为如果要建立一种普遍的权威，那么肯定地授予特殊权力既荒谬又无用。”(每个原始强调。)
Hamilton never contended for--indeed, he evidently would have opposed strenuously--use of the Federal power to tax and spend so as in effect to give the Federal government indirectly any control over anything, or anybody, which is not directly and openly authorized by the Constitution and its amendments through enumeration of the powers granted to it by the people. He would undoubtedly have agreed with the distinction which Jefferson drew--in the above-mentioned addresses made after Hamilton's death--with regard to Federal aid to Education: that land-grants in aid of education are constitutional, partly because they could not possibly produce any degree of control over the recipient institutions due to such grants being a single-transaction measure as to each of the recipient institutions.
对于联邦政府定期的拨款，情况则恰恰相反，因为它们不可能避免对受援者产生实质控制的效果——无论这些控制是渐进的、微妙的、间接的，还是负面的(通过制造抑制)，无论如何安排以掩盖控制的因素。在1936年的巴特勒案中，最高法院真实地陈述(意见书70-71页):“授予或剥夺无限利益的权力就是强制或破坏的权力;”它重申(73-74页)并应用了宪法的基本原则，即宪法没有明确授权联邦政府直接做的事情，以便能够行使控制，“……它可能不会通过征税和支出来确保合规，从而间接实现这些目标。”2022世界杯小组赛分组换句话说，宪法赋予的权力不得被这个政府滥用，以致实际上使它能够间接地行使一项未被赋予而因此被禁止的权力。而在相关的威卡德案(1942年)中，法院断言(正确，但只有在特定补贴是由宪法授权的情况下):“政府监管它所补贴的东西几乎不缺乏正当程序。”(意见书第131页;这里的“调节”是指控制。)根据他的著作，包括上面提到的1791年的论断，汉密尔顿会同意也会反对联邦政府的任何和所有补贴和控制计划，因为这些计划是违宪的，除非这些计划是由人民通过宪法修正案直接和明确授权的，赋予政府公开和直接控制受补贴的个人或机构的权力。麦迪逊和其他所有制定宪法和采纳宪法的人也会同意——杰斐逊也会同意。
The fields of power denied to the Federal government by the Constitution, according to both Hamilton and Jefferson--agriculture, education and so on, as noted above---could be multiplied by citing other writings by them and other Founders; but this is unnecessary for present purposes and would not take into account any additions to Federal power authorized by subsequent amendments. It is desirable, therefore, to quote here a modern writing which correctly reflects the views of The Framers and Adopters as to the initial instrument's exclusion of fields of power from Federal control and, in addition, takes into account all amendments to the present period.
A 1930 writing which fills this need is available; and, in addition, it is an excellent and concise discussion of the traditional American philosophy and system of government regarding especially the nature and importance of decentralization of power ("States Rights") as a mainstay of the security of the people's liberties. The Constitution has not been amended since 1930 to increase Federal power, so this writing in effect speaks as of today with regard to the extent of Federal powers; indeed, they have since been decreased by repeal of the 18th ("Prohibition") Amendment by adoption in 1933 of the 21st Amendment. This 1930 writing is cited for the further reason that it is couched in simple terms and presents only ideas which were then common knowledge and accepted truths among the American people--even among Youth with a normal high-school education for that period--as well as among the people through all generations from 1787 to 1930. The writing is cited not because it expressed anything new, or any original thinking of its author but, on the contrary, because it did not do so. Its special usefulness and value stem from the fact that it merely re-stated the traditional view as always understood and supported up to 1930 by all competent scholars and authorities--including the three Branches of the Federal government, especially the Supreme Court--as well as by leaders and the American people in general. This widespread understanding was such in 1930 that, if the valedictorian of a graduating class of a college, or even of a high school, had then made this address as the one usual on such an occasion, the audience would justly have applauded on the ground that there was nothing in it but long-accepted truths so well known that it merely evidenced the young orator's being soundly and reasonably well-informed regarding the elementary simplicities of the traditional American philosophy and system of constitutionally limited and decentralized power and its fundamental importance to the safety of the American people's God-given, unalienable rights.
This writing referred to is the March 2, 1930 "States Rights" address of Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York--the full text of which, for the foregoing reasons, is set forth in the Appendix to this study-guide. This Address--made as an appeal to the American people for support of his plan to be elected President and presenting some of the basic principles which, he impliedly assured them, he would if elected faithfully support--was in criticism of any concentration of power in Washington in violation of the Constitution's limits on Federal power.
The entire address merits careful study for the reasons previously noted; but, at this point in the present discussion of fields of power prohibited to the Federal government by the Constitution as amended, the following short quotation will suffice:
"As a matter of fact and law, the governing rights of the States are all of those which have not been surrendered to the National Government by the Constitution or its amendments. Wisely or unwisely, people know that under the Eighteenth Amendment Congress has been given the right to legislate on this particular subject, but this is not the case in the matter of a great number of other vital problems of government, such as the conduct of public utilities, of banks, of insurance, of business, of agriculture, of education, of social wel[are and of a dozen other important features. In these, Washington must not be encouraged to interfere." (Emphasis added.)
To repeat, the Constitution has never been amended since 1930 so as to increase the Federal government's power. Since then, no amendment has granted it any power to control any of the prohibited fields of power specified by Hamilton, Jefferson and Roosevelt as mentioned above. It is of unusual interest to note that agriculture---expressly listed by Hamilton in 1787 and by Roosevelt as of 1930 as being among the fields of power prohibited to the Federal government by the Constitution--was the subject of the above-mentioned Butler case (1936): There the Supreme Court confirmed the fact of such prohibition, in deciding that the Federal law under consideration--seeking to subsidize and control agriculture--violated the Constitution's limits on Federal power and therefore was null and void, judged by this instrument's original meaning which the Court correctly ruled is controlling unless and until the people change these limits by due amendment of this basic law.
It is a fundamental principle of the American philosophy that the people themselves, as well as their public servants who are sworn to support the Constitution faithfully, must respect the existing limits on the Federal government's power under the Constitution, as amended; which can be changed by the people only by its amendment. Referring to the amending process as a "solemn and authoritative act," Hamilton stated the principle (previously noted) in The Federalist number 78 as follows: "Until the people have by some solemn and authoritative act annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act." (Here "sentiments" refers to public opinion in favor of some measure not authorized by the Constitution.) The reason why this principle is so basically important was stressed in Washington's Farewell Address as follows:
"If in the opinion of the People, the distribution or modification of the Constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield."
这凸显了美国人民始终充分了解宪法对联邦政府权力的限制的巨大重要性;为了能够充分履行个人自由-责任所固有的义务，从而使他们的上帝赋予的、不可剥夺的权利和后代关于个人自由及其支持制度的公正遗产的持久安全成为可能。
"Vindiciamus"