Should philosophy be a politically engaged practice?

More specifically, should philosophers, when doing philosophy, think, speak, and write in ways that address contemporary political problems?

关于这个问题，(至少)有两种观点。政治参与学派认为，哲学——对思想及其之间关系的严格反思——应该倾向于解决出现在政治争论领域(种族、性别、权力结构)的智力问题。David Livingstone Smith, for example, posted recently:

We philosophers still primarily talk to one another, and not enough to non-philosophers about matters that people actually care about. Stop worrying about theories of reference and start worrying (publicly) about the Trump presidency (among other things). We need to organize. We need conferences that are geared towards communicating to non-philosophers rather than just to one another.

Smith, who isa friend of Philosophy Talk, is one of the best examples of a philosopher who does staypolitically engaged.

On the other hand is the Politically Detached School. That School’s view is well summarized by Timothy Williamson, who said recently, “I find the current atmosphere of self-righteous moralizing and vindictive internet mobs in the discipline deeply disturbing (whether the mob is on the left or the right).”

Williamsoncontinued:

The moralizing atmosphere spreads into philosophical theorizing itself, lowering standards of argument and evidence. As moral stakes rise, epistemic standards fall: ‘This is too important for quibbling’. Philosophers compete with each other in the virtue stakes. There are inevitably pressures to say things because saying them is politically convenient, rather than because you know them to be true. There are even greater pressures to not say things because saying them is politically inconvenient, or even a career-killer. Philosophers don’t have the best track record of resisting such pressures.

Williamson’s idea is that psychological pressures that arise when doing philosophy in a socially engaged wayunderminethe intellectual qualities that are supposed to be distinctive of philosophy: clarity, rigor, reasonableness, and generality—among others.

Is either School right?

我的观点是，这两种观点都歪曲了哲学应有的样子。我想说两点。

1. Different kinds of minds, even within philosophy, are good at different things.

2. 一些有哲学头脑的人在政治参与方面非常糟糕，而另一些人则很好。

I take the general idea for 1 from Temple Grandin, the famous autistic designer of more humane abattoirs. Grandin, who is a visual genius but lacks the attentional control and social sensitivities of neurotypical people, has long argued that society should embrace cognitive diversity. In making her point inThe Autistic Brain, Grandin writes:

During the Japanese tsunami catastrophe of 2011, the Fukushima nuclear power plants melted down because the tidal wave that came over the seawall flooded not only the main generator but its backup. And where was the backup located? In the basement—the basement of a nuclear power plant that is located next to the sea. As I read many descriptions of the accident, I couldseethe water flowing into the plant, and I couldseethe emergency generators disappearing under the water.

Her point is that if the designers of the plant had included morevisual思考者(像她自己)，淹没备用发电机的风险本应被认识和避免。让非视觉思考者做视觉思考者更擅长的工作(解决某些问题)有助于导致崩溃。认识到认知多样性可能是解决问题的办法。

我认为这一点也适用于哲学。许多哲学家善于从逻辑上分析最简单、最基本的话语、思想或理性选择的例子，然后用具有理论启发式的方式将分析的成分组合起来。然而，以这种方式思考所需要的注意力可能会让人感到困惑，并容易在令人担忧的政治局势中失去必要的背景。另一方面，一个能看到充满忧虑的政治局势的更大图景的哲学家可能不具备另一个哲学家那种激光般的注意力。

The banal but important point, then, is thatsome哲学家应该从事政治参与哲学，而其他人不应该。A philosopher who is prone to missing context may just not be good at doing politically engaged philosophy, but that doesn’t mean that her skills lack value or that someoneelsealso shouldn’t do politically engaged philosophy. Smith’s repeated use of the word “We” (three times!) seems to overreach.

与此同时，威廉姆森可能过于谨慎了。他当然是对的，许多哲学家可能没有克制，不去“竞争……在美德的赌注。”But a rare kind of philosopher (I know a few) may have the fortitude to write in a politically engaged way,withoutlowering epistemic standards. What’s needed, then, is frank self-evaluation (perhaps with some help from friends) before jumping into the fray, in order to get clear where one stands in philosophy’s vast forest of cognitive diversity: can I write with an awareness of a broad historical and cultural context? will I be tempted to compete in the “virtue stakes”? can I maintain epistemic standards in a politically fraught discussion? If the answers to these questions are a clear “yes,” then go ahead. But otherwise…maybe critiquing the latest theory of reference is more for you.

And critiquing the latest theory of reference isnot a bad thing. The politically disengaged philosopher is often a paradigm of rigorous thinking, who is apt (through technical skill) to find the holes in need of repair in any given argument. Obviously, anyone who makes arguments, including more politically engaged philosophers, can benefit from having someone like that around.

The deeper point, of course, is that one shouldn’t succumb to the thought that philosophy must be done only one way or another. People who seek detailed technical achievements are great, but it’s good for them to hang out with people who seek to rearrange the broader political picture.Weshould listen to each other—and ask ourselves what our skills enable us to contribute. If we do—as Grandin might emphasize—we might avoid a meltdown.