优秀的剧情简介。我想我同意泰勒教授的观点，即怀疑论的挑战是无法解决的，所以我们的知识讨论就简化为讨论为我们现象世界量身定做的信念形成策略。
Hume probably gave the only answer to the skeptical challenge one could hope to give, namely, that at the end of the day we all (do and probably should) set aside the assumptive and discriminative problems you've limned and go about "knowing" things about our world (such as it seems to us), with more or less fitting results. I might be trapped in a dream or a simulation, but then if so my best hope for escape would seem to lie in rational belief formation. For what other strategy is there?

The two skeptical arguments above are interesting, but I think Ken
was asking a question in his previous posts that has not
yet been addressed: are there powerful arguments
against rational (or justified or warranted) belief?
For instance, can we modify the above two arguments to produce
compelling arguments that no one can have justified beliefs about
外部世界吗?
This had some plausibility:
H.4 Beliefs that depend for their evidence on an unjustifiable assumption do not count as knowledge.
but what about this?
H.4* Beliefs that depend for their evidence on an unjustifiable assumption do not count as justified.
A similar change for D is changing this
D.1 A person knows that p on the basis of evidence E, only if E rules out alternative possibilities to p.
to this:
D.1* A person is justified in believing that p on the basis of evidence E, only if E rules out alternative possibilities to p.
As far I can see, the reasons given in support of D.1 (on the second
解析:选d。我不确定H.4*。

很好的帖子,帕特里克。我认为这里我们需要区分认知论证和实践论证(这与Q的评论和Ken Taylor的帖子有关)。我认为有一种熟悉的感觉，如果行动a或信念B是我最好或唯一的选择，那么它实际上是理性的。但怀疑者并不是在挑战相信这些信念或按照这些信念行事的实际合理性。相反，他/她是在挑战这种信念的认识论地位，并声称它没有基于足够好的认识论(表明真理)理由。我现在的观点是这样的，支持H.4*:我可以看到，有时根据认知上不合理的假设来相信或行动实际上是理性的。但是，如果一个人在认知上的不合理假设的基础上，就能得到认知上的合理，这就不太可信了。如果可以的话，这应该是一个很大的惊喜。

Mike,
I don't think of the skeptical arguments as making knowledge claims themselves. Rather, they take claims that look good to us and show us where they lead. So I am not sympathetic to replies of the form "The skeptical argument assumes we know . . ."
I think your comment about an implict high standard is right. Maybe it is wrong to say we have to rule out every alternative possibility in order to know. But now things get interesting. We would like a principled account of which possibilities need to be ruled out and which do not, and if we can give one I think we will learn something about the nature of knowledge in the process.
I have some ideas about what account to give here:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/

Aaron,
我不确定你在这场争论中的立场。你说无法回答，但为什么?因为它不会出错?但是，我们缺乏知识的结论是正确的。如果你认为我们确实有知识(作为背景或其他的结果)，那么你一定认为这个论点在某个地方出了问题。
一些情境主义者将情境的重要性与Mike的观点结合起来:情境决定哪些可能性需要被排除，哪些不需要。我倾向于同意这一点，但我认为，要支持这一点，需要我们说一些有趣而重要的事情，关于知识是什么以及它是如何工作的。如果我们能做到这一点，那么休谟的论证是可以回答的。

Mike,
What makes the arguments interesting, on my view, is not that there is someone who is willing to defend them, and therefore someone who is committed to both the premises and conclusion. What makes them interesting, rather, is that the premises looks good to us, but we want to avoid the conclusion. This is a theoretical problem, not a practical or rhetorical problem, such as asserting something while at the same time denying the sort of knoweldge implied by the assertion.
Look at it this way-- the skeptical arguments would be interesting even if there were no one willing to assert them. We non-skeptics would still have exactly the same problem, i.e. that all the premises seem right whereas the conclusion seems wrong. We still want to know which premise to deny and why.

有没有人有讨论(明显的)第一原则的哲学来源(即“一个人在证据E的基础上知道p，只有当E排除了p的其他可能性”)?Cheers

Aaron,
You are imagining a debate with a committed skeptic, and you realize that such a person can always raise questions about any claim that is made by his opponent in the debate. You also realize that such a conversation could get nowhere, so long as the skeptic remains consistent in his/her refusal to allow any claim. I entirely agree. If you ever meet such a person, by all means don't get into a conversation with him. But the skeptical arguments I am interested in don't ask questions, and nowhere do they depend on an assumption to the effect that no claims are admissable. So I don't see how your points address those arguments.

Jeremy,
I recommend the following:
DeRose, K. and T. Warfield. Eds. (1999), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. New York: Oxford University Press. See especially DeRose's Introduction.
Pritchard, D. (2002a), ?Recent Work on Radical Skepticism.? American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 39. no. 3, pp. 215-257.

Mike,
I don't find arguments from self-defeat persuasive here, partly for the reasons I have already given. But here is a different point: even if such arguments show that skeptical arguments are mistaken, they don?t show where they are mistaken. That is, they don?t show which assumptions of the arguments are false, and so no lesson is learned from them. Here is another thought: I am already assuming that the skeptical argument is mistaken somewhere. I think I know that I know that here is a hand, and so I don?t need self-defeat arguments to show me or convince me that the skeptical arguments go wrong. The interesting question is WHERE do they go wrong.
I think we can distinguish three grades of success in a response to a skeptical argument, each being more satisfying than the former: a) identify an assumption that we need not accept, b) find a reason for thinking that some assumption is false, and c) find an explanation for why some assumption is false, e.g. come up with a theory of knowledge that explains the mistake. Notice that an objection from self-defeat does not even give us the least satisfying of these grades.

Aaron,
But this sounds like you are simply agreeing with the skeptic-- i.e. that there are various possbilities and they can't be ruled out. Maybe you are saying that they don't need to be ruled out for us to have knowledge.
On my view we have to get clear about what we mean by "rule out." On some readings, I think we can rule out the dream possibility, and so the premise is false. On other readings, I think it turns out false that we need to rule out all the alternative possibilities. But either way, there is something in the argument to deny, and progress to be made by explaining why we can challenge the argument at that point.

Hello there,
有趣的讨论。我想提出一个建议，也许能更好地表达像肯·泰勒和其他提出类似观点的人的担忧。
As well as justification of beliefs, we might perhaps define another quality: blameworthiness for believing something. (Just bear with me and it will make more sense at the end.)
Despite the moral connotations, the notion of blameworthiness I have here has nothing to do with blameworthiness in that sense. It's "epistemic blameworthiness" if I may so fancy. Suppose that a chess player, without due reflection and calculation, decides upon a move M. The chess player can be "blamed" for his belief that M should be his next move, since he decided upon it without any reflection.
Now suppose that one day you wake up and see a powerful demon who is laughing at all the foolish beliefs you just had and chastising you for not taking skepticism seriously. "But," you say, "there was no EVIDENCE whatsoever for believing in a skeptical hypothesis. True, I may not have had the correct beliefs. Nonetheless, given the evidence I had, these were the BEST beliefs that I could possibly have. Surely, I can't be BLAMED for having them." And this time, you wake up to find yourself in the Matrix.
My point is that even if the skeptic's arguments work for justification and knowledge, there is a sense of blameworthiness for believing that is substantially weaker than both justification and knowledge and for which the skeptics arguments don't work.

只是一个附录。
Here is the distinction between justification and epistemic blameworthiness:
A weak chess player might contemplate over a chess position and after due reflection may decide on a move. The move may be indeed bad and in the light of proper analysis, completely UNJUSTIFIED. Nevertheless, the weak chess player can't be blamed for deciding on that, since he did his "epistemic duty".
I have a feeling that this discussion is likely to spill into the discussion concerning ethics of belief.

To strive above all at holding as many true and as few false beliefs as possible, is not rational. This is one of the valuable points made by Mikael Stenmark in a discussion with Vincent Brümmer about the theism-atheism debate.
Brümmer他自己经常争论说，既然人类不仅仅是知道的主体，而是行动者，他们的决定的合理性，关于采取哪一种生活的观点，不能充分地从一个纯粹的认识论的观点，但应该考虑到实用主义的考虑。在展开他的论点时，他借鉴了马丁·海德格尔(Martin Heidegger)的著作，但类似的见解也可能来自路德维希·维特根斯坦(Ludwig Wittgenstein)。
事实上，我认为休谟——不像笛卡尔——在发展他的怀疑论时，以他自己的方式，试图精确地阐明这一点。他并不是要说服任何人相信怀疑论，而是要说明某种认识论方法的荒谬。明智的做法，理性的方法，是以一种适合自己的方式生活下去。
当代一位重要的思想家广泛地发展了这种理性方法，他就是温泽尔·范·胡斯汀。他从进化的角度看待理性，这有助于他将理性视为一种适应能力，一种为了有意义地生活而使用的能力。这与科学哲学中关注工具价值科学理论的观点相联系，即它们旨在解释，预测和控制。
From this kind of perspective the crucial question as far as our basic assumptions about the world is concerned, is not whether we can prove them, but rather whether it is wise to live with them, whether they help us to live well. And perhaps behind it all lies the intuition that if something works, that must be because it has some link with how things really are. And with the question: What does it mean for something to be "real"?
- Gerrit Brand
(Visit my blog at gerritbrand.blogspot.com)

Hello!
我希望没有人介意我对这篇文章发表一些看法。
I haven't read through every post above, but I would like to challenge this proposition.
1. A person knows that p on the basis of evidence E, only if E rules out alternative possibilities to p.
This seems ambiguous to me. Intuitively I should have thought if you recognise something, you recognise that thing. If your recognising that thing e.g. your wife consisted in ruling out other possibilities, that would seem highly implausible. How do you know which other possibilities are the ones you need to rule out? And why just these possibilities? On the other hand if you recognise your wife directly, then this as a matter of logic automatically does rule out all other possibilities because they are not your wife. So does this proposition 1) mean a) in order to recognise something (or have a reason for supposing something) this must entail some other possibilities are ruled out, or does it mean b) the nature of having evidence for E consists in ruling out other possibilities?
即使是a)也可能会受到挑战。例如，有人可能会说，如果你一生中唯一看到的是一种红色，那么这种知觉体验就永远不会在你的意识中记录下来。我们必须至少有另一种视觉体验，这样我们才能将一件事与另一件事进行对比，从而记住其中任何一件事。这是a)的一个论点，似乎是可信的。但假设你只经历了一次你一生中最剧烈的痛苦，这是否意味着你永远不会意识到哪里出了问题?你将如何，或者你能如何着手解决在争论中看似合理的问题?
Justin

An Equation of Truth
Truth is when the subjective = the objective
Or simply: Subject = Object
Or more simply: =
=就是真理。
其他的一切充其量只是可能的或不确定的。
Life without measure is equal and equal makes the Universe One.
Equal = "free at last, free at last, free at last..."
"The truth shall set us free."
=
MJA

The old bottom line: Apply the skeptical argument to itself --- things could be another way entirely,we're brains in vats and so on ----and you will be skeptical of skepticism; things could be other than the way skeptics depict them. Skeptics, since they maintain that they know they are correct,cannot admit that things could be other than they say--without contradiction. If the reply is that one cannot apply skeptical argument to itself---why not?
奇怪的是，要使怀疑论的论点成立，怀疑论必须坚持，似乎世界是一种特殊的方式，而不是其他方式——否则怀疑论就不能认为我们不能知道事物的真实状态。那么问题来了，怀疑论是如何知道事物存在真实状态的。他们从哪里得到的?

If we'll never know if we know--have the correct thought of-- the true state of things, then I could be wrong in holding that I don't
know the true state of things. But this seems intuitively impossible---how can I not know what thought
arises within me?