What Is Good Philosophy?

06 February 2020

Not too long ago, I had aTwitter exchangewith中国伊朗亚洲杯比赛直播’s Joshua Landy about whether Sigmund Freud was a good philosopher. I took the position that Freud was a good philosopher (in fact, an excellent one) while Joshua expressed the opposite view. I left the conversation feeling perplexed. How could we have such wildly different assessments of the same guy? At first, I thought that one of us must be wrong, and started to worry that it was me. Then, reflecting further, it struck me that I’ve never given much thought to the question of what good philosophy is—and that maybe my dispute with Josh grew out of our having different background ideas about how to answer this question.

So, what is good philosophy? Is it just a matter of taste? Or are there guidelines for separating the wheat from the chaff?

One consideration is whether a piece of work is executed with technical proficiency. If a philosophical work is sloppy—for instance, because it relies on fallacious reasoning, out-and-out contradictions, or ignores counterexamples—this certainly might count against its being good philosophy. Technical correctness is an attractive criterion because it’s pretty black-and-white. Determining whether an argument is valid is, at least in principle, a purely objective matter. That’s why such judgments often take pride of place as a sieve through which journal submissions are passed when editors have to make a call about whether to accept or reject an article for publication.

But logic and precision aren’t everything, and there are several problems with leaning too heavily on this criterion. One is that it’s possible (and I dare say quite common) for a philosopher to argue impeccably and yet produce philosophical work that’s utterly vapid, not to mention the fact that overly conscientious efforts to plug every argumentative hole by anticipating every possible objection can bury an interesting thesis under a mudslide of qualifications. Another problem is that even the “great” philosophical works—the ones that are included in the canon—are far being entirely lucid fallacy-free, even though their devoted interpreters may have a penchant for papering over cracks in their arguments. And in some cases, the quest for technical expertise just seems irrelevant. Complaining that Nietzsche’sThus Spoke Zarathustrais short on clear, explicit, logical argumentation simply misses the point.

So, what other guidelines can we turn to? One is that good philosophy is oftentransformative. It helps us to see the world in new ways, revealing aspects that were previously invisible. I’ve never heard anyone gush that a work of philosophy changed their life because all of its arguments are deductively valid. Rather, they say that it made a difference to them by shining a light in the darkness, making familiar things seem unfamiliar, or helping them attend to what’s truly important in life.

If transformativeness is a philosophical virtue, then there’s something irreducibly subjective about the goodness of philosophical work, because whether or not a piece of philosophy is transformative depends a lot on the receptivity of its consumers. There’s also an aesthetic element involved in this: the form of philosophical discourse is important as well as its content. Some kinds of writing are more likely to have greater impact on some people than other kinds have, even if they all express exactly the same ideas.

What aboutoriginality?在知识界提出一个新问题,肯定有助于一部作品成为优秀哲学的典范。这是真的,即使始作俑者没有很好地寻求问题的答案(或者即使他们从未试图回答它——想想苏格拉底)。Originality is often tied toproductivity. A philosophical work is productive to the extent that it spawns more philosophical work in an ongoing research tradition. Alfred North Whitehead’s famous remark that the European philosophical tradition consists of a series of footnotes to Plato epitomizes this idea. Works included in the philosophical canon are by definition highly productive—giving rise to whole philosophical traditions and counter-traditions, and vast, labyrinthine literatures.

但重要的是要认识到,哲学作品的生产力取决于其诞生的社会、知识和政治环境,也取决于其固有的力量。Copies of David Hume’sTreatise of Human Nature, which is one of Western philosophy’s biggest hits, didn’t immediately fly off the bookstore shelves. Instead, it “fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots,” as Hume put it in an autobiographical sketch.If Simone de Beauvoir’sThe Second Sex写于14世纪的巴黎,人们对它的接受程度会与1949年大不相同。一粒种子能否长成一株植物,在很大程度上取决于它所生长的土壤。

总而言之,我们很难说清楚什么是好的哲学。这涉及到各种各样的考虑因素,它们可以相互流动,也可以相互分离,没有明确的衡量标准来衡量它们。决定什么是好的哲学是一件混乱的、经常是主观的、历史上偶然发生的事情。也许,哲学的作品有很多方面是好的,而聪明、见多识广的人对这些作品会有如此强烈的分歧,这一事实应该被称赞,因为这反映了我们这个特殊学科的丰富和复杂性。

Comments(5)


MJA's picture

MJA

Sunday, February 9, 2020 -- 2:55 PM

Philosophy is truth, and

哲学就是真理,真理没有好坏之分,它就是真理。真相的影响可能是好的也可能是坏的取决于环境,但这不是问题所在。

There are though many philosophical ideas that have been proven untrue through the tests of time, Plato's forms for example. and they would be considered not bad or good but simply incorrect, right?

那么,在我们目前所知的所有哲学著作中,有哪些是真实的呢?什么是真的吗?
Has philosophy found the answer yet?
You know, the absolute. In physics, certainty. In religion, God. In justice, beyond the grayness of fair. In democracy, the truth that we hold self-evident.
What is the single truth that solves them all, I think it is good to know.

Thanks,
=

Harold G. Neuman's picture

Harold G. Neuman

Sunday, February 9, 2020 -- 12:08 PM

I think, based on some things

I think, based on some things I have been reading lately, that this is the wrong question. One needs to switch a couple of words around, in order to get at the right one. The question should be (and I have this on good authority): What good is philosophy? Well, for example, Jefferson, Madison and several other founding fathers found Enlightenment philosophers helpful when it came to crafting a New World government. Men like Hume and Rousseau grabbed their attention. Now, we do not give as much credence to such historical figures today, but, this is now, and different philosophical issues, perhaps deeper ones, demand attention. Good philosophy, though, is, arguably, that which gets published, or at least that which affords a livelihood for its'. practitioners. There are so many variations and so much squabbling among those in the discipline, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish smoke from fire. Pragmatism speaks to some, while leaving others cold.. Some fairly worship Davidson, Dewey, Nagel and others of the ilk; while some think Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Nietzsche, et al, had the most to say about human conditions (The Human Condition is a tired platitude which ought to be re-tired or buried, even though I still use it, in the context of that caveat.) Michel Foucault has his loyal admirers. What IS good philosophy? I really don't know, but I have learned a lot in the last twenty years. And I have learned from a diversity of philosophical treatises. I may even revisit Habermas, because apparently my first exposure to his notions was too early in the game. I probably will not read Plato; Socrates; Aristotle; and others of their time. Because that was then; this is now; I have my own philosophy to do and precious little time to do it...

Harold G. Neuman's picture

Harold G. Neuman

Tuesday, February 11, 2020 -- 11:06 AM

Not that it is all that

Not that it is all that directly related to this post, or even all that interesting, in itself, I thought I'd share an excerpt from a recent essay of mine concerning knowledge, opinion and belief. My previous comment, above (February 9, 2020)might serve as an introduction, of sorts, to the following:

...It is seductive to posit that if there were a continuum on which opinion,belief and knowledge might rest, belief would naturally fall somewhere between the others. But, I do not know how that could be right. Opinions can be based on facts and other bits of knowledge, while knowledge obtains its own unassailable standing, PRO SE. More often, a belief is based only on what someone has said about about something, rather than any nuggets of indisputable fact. Belief, as such, lies within a never-land, not demonstrably true, yet neither indubitably false...

So, good philosophy MAY be strictly in the eyes and ears of the beholder and what that beholder wants to believe, based on preferences and/or that cognitive bias, briefly discussed in an earlier post. Philosophers who ring resoundingly for me, may ring resoundingly hollow for someone else, and the other way round. That's the thing about beliefs and opinions---there are dozens of them out there... Over the last two days, I have 'pitched' an essay to a local newspaper. They seemed genuinely interested in publishing it---until I told them I did not wish to have my picture in the paper. I cited privacy concerns, which they chose to ignore. Ironically, part of the essay decried the narcissism and so-called 'transparency' of the world as we now know it. Apparently, the notion of privacy is archaic. In most quarters. Too bad policies are so inflexible.

Harold G. Neuman's picture

Harold G. Neuman

Friday, February 14, 2020 -- 9:11 AM

A few more thoughts on my 02

A few more thoughts on my 02/11/2020 comments::
...People confuse knowledge with opinion. That is a mistake. While opinion may be based, in part, on knowledge, this does not work the other way round. The larger mistake occurs when belief is confused with either of the former. Whereas opinion and knowledge reside, roughly, on the same 40 acres, belief lives on a totally different farm...

Harold G. Neuman's picture

Harold G. Neuman

Wednesday, February 26, 2020 -- 10:47 AM

What is GOOD philosophy? I

What is GOOD philosophy? I still don't know, but keep trying to write some anyway. Here's a late entry, based on language and the ways we can misuse it. Put it, if you wish, under the heading, philosophy of language. Fascinating topic, that.

The Veil of Deceit:

Transgression is no more than a watered-down term for aggression; a linguistic distinction with a softened prefix, in a guise of civility via diplomacy. Yet, there is nothing civil about either act. They are inseparably joined, head-to-foot: diluted hostility remains hostility nonetheless, and is, in the end, a regressive drain on the higher-order consciousness of which human beings are capable. Surreptitiousness is an evil of a particularly egregious sort. The placebo effect of language and its propensity to re-invent itself bestow an aura of acceptability and comfort on an uncertain world, while a veil of deceit blankets the broad horizon.