I’d like to talk frankly about why research on the topic of self-deception hasn’t made much progress—as far as I can see—despite a steady-stream of on-going interest. There’s been some excellent work, but it doesn’t seem to me that the topic on the whole has moved forward all that much.

在哲学和心理学中，都有一种把自我欺骗当作一回事的倾向。如果是一种情况，我们可以求出它是多少。对吧?

哲学家的方法是试图解决自我欺骗的悖论，并根据必要和/或充分条件来分析自我欺骗。

The psychologist’s approach is to try to demonstrate experimentally that certain behaviors require positing a mental state of “self-deception.” (This approach is excellently illustrated by the classic 1979 article from Ruben Gur and Harold Sackheim, entitled “Self-Deception: a Concept in search of a Phenomenon.”)

Neither approach is exactly wrong. But here’s the problem. “Self-deception” is a term that only loosely refers. If we were to survey all the psychological states that the term can aptly be applied to, we’d find vast differences within that set of perfectly real phenomena. There are, at least, what I would callclassic self-deception,self-inflation bias,semi-pretense, andfalse emotion在我看来，所有这些都是不同的，但它们都被宽泛地称为“自我欺骗”。我很快就会谈到这些。现在，让我们继续关注方法论问题。

自我欺骗是一种统一现象这一隐含的假设以不同的方式给哲学家和心理学家带来了问题。

For philosophers: any good analysis ofoneof the self-deceptive phenomena (which ends up being an “analysis of self-deception [full stop]”) is subject to apparent counterexamples from someone who points to one of theother自欺的现象。例如，理论家1(他头脑中有典型的自我欺骗)可能产生一个“自我欺骗的分析”，而理论家2(他头脑中有错误的情绪)提出了一个“反例”。由于这种错误的统一的假设，这两个理论家实际上是在互相议论而没有意识到这一点。他们都在谈论“自我欺骗”。

For psychologists: the problem is even simpler to describe. Bodies of data can seem to contradict when they in fact don’t, simply because a data set about one phenomenon is labeled under the same heading (“self-deception”) as a data set that’s in fact about a distinct phenomenon. Something like this may be what happened in the debate in the 1990s consisting of Shelley Taylor (and colleagues) versus Randy Colvin (and colleagues). The “self-deceptive” phenomena that Taylor found conducive to success and happiness are just not the same mental states as the “self-deceptive” phenomena that Colvin found detrimental to social well-being. (I do some untangling of that particular debate in “Self-Deception Won’t Make You Happy,” in case you’re interested.)

This whole situation impresses upon me one thing that Robert Trivers told me once. He said that what Ishould用我的时间和哲学能力做的是逻辑分析和区分不同种类的自我欺骗，这可能对每个人都有好处。我认为他是在暗示，寻找自我欺骗的圣杯分析是一个错误。

So here I’d like to make some progress on his suggestion. The following four phenomena are distinct, although they could all (in some cases more loosely than others) be called “self-deception.”

Classic self-deception. This is a phenomenon of motivated irrationality, in which motivational forces in the agent somehow drive him/her to form a belief that runs contrary to the wealth of evidence that she possesses. The mind is in some sense divided. Thus, classic self-deception is rightly said to involve some sort of epistemic tension. This is the phenomenon that philosophers are most focused on, since it seems paradoxical. But being focused on classic self-deception hasn’t saved us from accidentally labeling cases of the other phenomena as “self-deception.”

Self-inflation bias. We often hear statistics along the following lines. “94% percent of college professors believe they are above average in their scholarly abilities.” “85% of people think they are above average at driving.” And so on. These statistics are evidence of ageneral tendencypeople have to think better of themselves than rigorous analysis of the evidence would warrant. Importantly, I don’t think this self-inflation bias needs to involve an epistemic tension like self-deception does. The self-inflator is wholehearted in her high opinion of herself. Furthermore, thisgeneraltendency isn’t motivated byspecificdesires and insecurities, as is the case in classic self-deception.

Semi-pretense. Often we go about imitating others without any intention to imitate or pretend. Sartre’s waiter is a great example of this. We take on the trappings of a certain character, without even being aware that that’s what’s happening. If the character I’m unwittingly imitating is inappropriate to my actual circumstances, someone might say I’m deceiving myself. But I prefer to call this phenomenonsemi-pretense，因为它介于平淡的行动和十足的假装之间。(但请注意，如果行为人在半伪装的基础上继续形成信念，半伪装可能会导致典型的自我欺骗。)

False emotion. As Robert Frank discusses inPassions within Reason在美国，人们通常出于战略性的社会原因而产生情绪。通常很好。我们哭可能是因为我们真的需要帮助。但是哭泣可能与真实需求的数量不成比例——这是一种操纵他人按自己意愿行事的方式。重要的是，这种操纵性的错误情绪不需要(或许通常也不需要)有意识地计划。代理人被她自己的虚假情绪说服了!这也可以被宽泛地称为自我欺骗，尽管它与前三种现象有很大的不同。

There are other distinct phenomena, too, that pre-theoretically get thrown into the basket of “self-deception.” Progress will require greater precision going forward.

I’d like to close this blog with a note to anyone who, like me, takes an interest in the evolutionary status of “self-deception.” I have argued in various places that self-deception is not an adaptation evolved by natural selection to serve some function. Rather, I have said self-deception is a spandrel, which means it’s a structuralbyproductof other features of the human organism. My view has been that features of mind that are necessary for rational cognition in a finite being with urgent needs yield a capacity for self-deception as a byproduct. On this view, self-deception wasn’t selected for, but it also couldn’t be selected out, on pain of losing some of the beneficial features of which it’s a byproduct. This viewseemsopposed to the view of Robert Trivers, who maintains that self-deception is an adaptation to facilitate interpersonal deception. But it could be, in light of the foregoing distinctions, that Trivers and I were talking past each other.

I hereby wish to suggest the following. Self-inflation bias and false emotion are evolutionary adaptations that serve interpersonal deception, as Trivers has theorized. But classic self-deception and semi-pretense are in fact spandrels. Whether or not I am right in these particular hypotheses, I think the methodological point of this blog still stands.