Hi Walto. I have a question about your post. You write in your second paragraph that we should: "assume that in all the situations or worlds we want to compare, we have perfect equality, and when we increase goods we increase them equally for everyone." But then in your third paragraph, we're comparing two worlds in which one has more equitably distributed goods than the other.
So is the question: given two worlds, one of which enjoys a more desirable distribution of goods, is the world with more goods the better world?

Hi. I put that badly. I meant to say in the third graph that BOTH worlds have their goods equitably distributed. If we assume that, are there any goods (and I mean intrinsic goods--not cherry pie slices) of which we are comfortable saying "the more of them, the better"? Pleasure? Knowledge? Virtue? Happiness? Opportunity? Freedom?
Thanks.

哦，我现在看到了。好吧，我不确定我有一个答案，但我想起了摩尔，当他考虑两个世界时，一个是非常美丽的，另一个是最丑陋的世界。摩尔说，即使在这两个世界中，没有有意识的人可以从痛苦中获得快乐，但前者本质上比后者要好。如果这是真的，那么我认为同样的推理也适用于有意识存在的世界——越好越好。

德·梅斯特尔认为善与恶是平衡的，他认为世界上善的增加也会增加恶。另一方面，约翰·罗尔斯对比了“极大极小”和“极大极小”。但对效用的量化是徒劳的。一个简单的经济事实是，社会的财富是通过最大化最低阶层来最大化的。但是，如果认为每个人带到自己的私人享受场所的东西就是价值或好坏的衡量标准，那就大错特错了。我们可能会进行大量的个人商品消费，但我们通过认识到别人需要什么并作出回应来了解它是什么和意味着什么。回应本身可能不是世界商品的引擎，但它是老师。这就是为什么我们不能有意义地讨论或量化世界上的善，除非我们把商品交换、对需求的认识和对需求的反应，作为我们学习什么是善的背景。这并不意味着把别人想要或需要的东西视为好的，只是说我们只能享受生活中好的东西，作为与他人一起决定什么是好的，并提供它的戏剧的一部分。如果效用本质上是自私的标准，那么它就是有害的。 We discover what is good by exchanging with others what we need. Economists tout capital as a vast improvement over barter, but this is a deliberate distortion. Barter was almost certainly not a system of exchange so much as one of ongoing reassessment of need. People became deeply invested in each other through a constant revisiting of the worth of what has been traded amongst them and revising the account. A money economy truncates the exchange to no further part to be played in the needs and judgments of each other. Enjoying the good things of life becomes a private matter. Furthermore, it espouses obligation in the from of debt that has no personal character or investment in it. The more money there is in the world the less good we do each other, and the less we know the good in each other. We cannot quantify the difference, for the quantifier is the difference, and through it there is less good in the world.

加里，我觉得your interesting comment that you might take KINDNESS or VIRTUE to be goods of which "the more, the better" is true, though of course a world in desperate need of kindness or virtue or exemplifications of them might not be so great. So, never mind stuff like money or pleasure or satisfactions; do you think that, all else equal, a world with more of one or both of kindness or virtue in it must be better than one with less? Or what about Earnest Irony's (or G.E. Moore's) beauty suggestion? Is a world with more beauty in it necessarily better than one with less if all else is equal?

我的意思是，我认为你和摩尔不知道你认为你在量化什么。“更多”是什么意思?我不是一个多愁善感的人。我的观点是，所有的认识性和形式的测量和概念手段都是有缺陷的。关于这一点，我可以讲得很长，但相关的含义是，这种理性模式的不充分如何被认识到，并纳入我们的推理过程?时间确实是反常的事实和形式的推理。但仅仅是反常是没有意义的。然而，只要它使一个反应，本身反常的先行因果关系和逻辑形式，有意义的证据，这样的前提的不完全性，然后一些“更”完全前所未有的东西出现在时间。时间本身。我们如何认识这些“更多”，更不用说从这些“更多”中毕业了? Time is a community in contrariety to the concept of such an external measure of it. No one alone is anything to it. Quantification is void (cf. The Conquest of Abundance, by Paul Feyerabend).
The stark and isolated individualism of the West has a very specific source in the dogmatics of power. I could trace it if you wish. But quantifying private 'goods' is part of the dogmatism. So please do not accuse me of sentiment when I challenge it!

Walto, no time today, maybe tomorrow.

Grue? (green-blue?) Golyadkin color sense? Definitely! Maybe!
The answer is no. I am referring to the suppression of the historical truth about Western societies suppressed by history in an effort to grab authority in all things waged as a vicious dialectic between kings and religious leaders. Meanwhile, most people lived a village life so exquisitely democratic that we can hardly imagine how equitable life could be. Most others, aside from the central royal faction and the church, lived under the essential feudal status of a personal covenant. That covenant had no reach beyond the two men bound in it, and though one had land he conferred upon the other under the terms of the covenant, its conditions were not necessarily a settled matter, and did not set one man over the other. A feudal covenant was an accord between equals. Only when it came time to pass the covenant on to the next generation, or when the rivalry between crown and church imposed its hegemony upon it, did it become the hierarchical system we (wrongly) conceive of it today. The Reformation was an effort to defeat Roman/Latin domination by asserting religion as a personal covenant with the god (reminiscent of the personal relation in feudal contract). The equality, of course, was jettisoned. We are left with the asymmetrical relation with the universe we are burdened with today. The ramifications are extensive, but I think you can get a glimpse of it.

Hi. You write:
我的观点是，所有的认识性和形式的测量和概念手段都是有缺陷的。I can speak at any length you wish on that point
I encourage you to speak more on this topic. I'm interested, in particular, in Sen's questions about what, if anything, utilitarians are supposed to be counting. I take it that consequentialism involves some sort of intuition that "the more good, the better"--but I wonder...are there any goods for which this is true? So, sure, I'd love to hear more on this.
However, it would be more helpful to me (and I'm guessing some other readers too) if there were a bit less of this kind of thing:

然而，只要它使一个反应，本身反常的先行因果关系和逻辑形式，有意义的证据，这样的前提的不完全性，然后一些“更”完全前所未有的东西出现在时间。
I don't mean to imply that this remark is not both true and deep, only that very few readers are likely to understand it. I, at any rate, don't know what you are saying there, so I guess you'd need to bring it down to my level. (That's what this "other" is in need of.)
Also, I'm not sure why you suggest that I agree with Moore about beauty. I was just asking if YOU do, pursuant to another comment (by Earnest Irony) which offered beauty as a possible candidate in this connection. I've taken no position on anything--just asked a few questions.
Finally, I'm happy to retract any implication of mine according to which you are a "sentimentalist": I likely took my cues from remarks like these:

The more money there is in the world the less good we do each other, and the less we know the good in each other.

and
we learn what [value] is and means by recognizing what others are in need of and responding.

Again, thanks for your comments!

Walto,
谢谢你的回复。
我希望这不是完全没有根据的假设，一个帖子的作者对一个给定的作者有特殊的兴趣，在没有说明他的兴趣的性质(不幸的是，我可以安全地说他，因为很少有女性参与哲学)大体上同意他的观点。
I hope I can assume you know what anomaly is? What Antecedence and causality mean, as a continuity between points in a rational or real progression? Well, if that progression is vicious in some sense, if it is lacking in a perfectable rigor, then something anomalous to it is not necessarily outlaw to it, though the law of continuity implied implies it outlaw, or at least negligible (i.e., neglectable). But if we overtly share in only the language of continuity, and yet recognize the incompleteness of that continuity, even if every intuition of it is, each to his own, just anomaly, the (however slight) difference each of us brings to that intuition liberates the other from his own neglect of it, and so opening up new opportunities for re-conceiving all the term of that supposed continuity. This is how we learn. And it is a drama of participation, not of ratiocination. That is why we get to know each other coincidentally to our getting to know our world. But insofar as we are committed to the notion of continuity of reason and time we use neglect of the anomalous origin of it as sop to our predilection for certitude. What is required, in other words, is a virtuous dialectic that undermines the viciousness of the quantifier, or the vicious one (ego).
小便还是不小便?好吧，这甚至不是一个问题。在我这个年纪，尿尿不是尿尿，不尿尿就是尿尿。这一点也不矛盾。“矛盾法则”是我们理性能力的内在本质，这种自负的支点迫使我们将限定词瓦解为量词。量化支配着我们的思想，但不是我们的生活，当然，除非我们生活在一个对善的量化，被用作强制服从专制统治的手段的世界。如果世界上有更多的东西是红色的，红色会更红吗?如果我们用概念(命题的术语，与正式的调节量词相反)作为量，它们就充当量词的角色，因此保留了“矛盾法则”的伪装，但失去了意义。更确切地说，这完全破坏了我们理解我们理解的起源的努力。也就是说，摩尔的整个职业生涯，整个英美(逻辑实证主义)传统都不如一根棍子好。

Gary, you ask,

如果世界上有更多的东西是红色的，红色会更红吗?

And I take it most people would say NO to this. But what I'm actually wondering about is this:

If more things in the world were red would the WORLD be redder?

I think most people would say YES to that (although I recognize that your complaint about the law of non-contradiction might push you toward opposition to Yes-No questions, generally). Anyhow, this analogy between the color question and the same sort of question about "goods" (which, for all I know is contrary to Moore's take about the non-naturalness of goodness) may be helpful in thinking about whether people might also be prone to give the same affirmative answer with respect to 'goodness'--and, if so why (and what sort of "goodness items" might be consistent with such a response).
谢谢你。

No. Red would be muted.
If we deny that god exists the theist quickly retorts that the statement implies a belief in god. Is this the naturalistic fallacy? The ontological fallacy is that the fact of a thing or state implies a deontological necessity of it. But it is hard to see how we could fall into such error without desiring the consequence. But I am not advocating ambiguity or contrarian themes. There is a kind of contrariety which is more determinate than disambiguation. So much so it supplies the remedy to the incompleteness of formal or epistemic continuity. The contrariety of the infinitesimal is the most determinate term in math or logic. In the calculus, devised in the height of the Enlightenment Era to wrest temporality from the superstitious notions of the priests, the infinitesimal is that term of incalculable change rendered so small as to be negligible. But the mathematics of this is dubious (see The Analyst, by George Berkeley), and that final term is so far from negligible it is actually the most crucial and most rigorous term. But it is neither within nor without the calculation. It is neither one thing nor the other. But it is so in a sense so determinate that the meaning and rigor of the calculation is sealed by this determinate indeterminacy. Which one of us is us? Through which one of us is the good come into the world? Which one of us is the measure of it? Or of any term? Not this one! That is the determinacy of it. The good, or the meaning of any term, is not mine. That is how I know it is real. But my recognizing this is how it is real. That is, the idea of the good is not a possession, is not a private property or experience. More for me is always less what good is. The measure of how much good there is in the world is not how much each one would have of it.

In more concrete terms, the goods of the world are largely products of human effort. But whose are they? From time immemorial elites have left work to the workers, until one of a series of 'acts of enclosure' usurped the right of the villagers of England to elect their own supervisor, or reeve. When the Lords of England took away this ancient right they finally broke down the last wall the poor had against complete tyranny. This is analogous to the development of industry shortly thereafter, in which work was completely regulated, and its output completely in the hands of the owners of the manufactory. If this system produces more goods, does it produce more good? Whose? Whose the goods of the world if the people who actually produce them get a diminishing portion? For then, more goods in the world means, at least, a greater disparity of goods, and often, if not necessarily, less goods for those who actually produce them. In which case, more goods means less good in the world.

BTW, Gary.
I find this remark very interesting and thought-provoking:

无穷小的矛盾性是数学或逻辑中最确定的一项。在启蒙运动的鼎盛时期，为了从牧师们的迷信观念中争取时间的概念而设计的演算中，无穷小是指不可估量的变化的一个术语，它变得如此之小以至于可以忽略不计。但这其中的数学原理是可疑的(参见乔治·伯克利的《分析者》)，最后一个术语远不能忽略，它实际上是最关键、最严格的术语。但它既不在计算范围之内，也不在计算范围之内。这不是一回事，也不是另一回事。但它在某种意义上是如此具有决定性，以致计算的意义和严谨性都被这种决定性的不确定性所决定。

Can you suggest some (not too technical!) reading material on this? Much appreciated.

one of a series of 'acts of enclosure' usurped the right of the villagers of England to elect their own supervisor, or reeve. When the Lords of England took away this ancient right they finally broke down the last wall the poor had against complete tyranny.

Right on.
Most of your last graph, (which I largely agree with), is a restatement of claims made against the idea of simply summing happiness or personal preferences as the the brass ring of welfarism. Such complaints have been brought by as diverse a bunch as Rawls, Nozick and Sen, (not to mention Pareto). So you make justice a good thing too. Bully for you. Pretty much everybody in philosophy and economics has done so for a couple of generations. It could even be (and has been) argued that Mill did so as well. You also have concerns about interpersonal measurement. Well, so does everybody else. I mean, not just Arrow said the whole idea of that was meaningless, so did Schlick, nearly 100 years ago. So I agree with you, they agree with you, and the fat man above the trolley tracks likely does too.
In the first graph you ask Which one of us is us. Based on your second graph I'd say you are. You are us.

慷慨大方!像韦伯，兰德，熊彼特，施特劳斯和弗里德曼?

Douglas Joseph, Berkeley's Philosophy of Mathematics. It's a little daunting if you're not comfortable with math, but well explained. The basic theme is that the notion of the infinitesimal is the crux of the calculus, but that its value is positive through most of the justifying equations, but taken as zero as the clincher. A clear contradiction.
If the quantifier vitiates the good, and the value of all terms, then the quality of time articulates upon the determinacy of the infinitesimal as indeterminate between the calculated value and its opposite. That is, there is an incalculable range of values between is and is not, and so the universal qualifier the paring would be, if time were quantifiable, is not the hermetic divide it would need to be to warrant the reliance on formalism to settle value issues or even find or describe meanings. The quantifier is the void. There is no "one" time is. Nor is it found in its numbers. It is, rather, in the quality of the departed that the rest of time is found its realest term. Ready for some biology?
lorly?

Am I ready for some biology? That depends. Will it be, like the math, vintage 18th Century?

不，半生不熟的家常便饭，但很二十一世纪的风格。尽管我相当怀疑牛顿的微积分，在世界各地的物理课上，并没有那么糟糕。以至于伯克利的反对意见几乎没有被注意到，尽管在哲学上是深刻的，也许是决定性的。即使在今天，物理学家们仍在努力寻找无限小作为其对其极限的疏忽的定义点，这表明在其扩展范围的两端都失去了这种可忽略性。但如果时间只是不同，这就不足为奇了。
The biological issue is differentiation. For replication in a real sense isn't life. Cells that merely replicate are not alive if, however ancient the cell mass or however many of its number has been destroyed or consumed, are nevertheless remnants if the ancient individual cells. That is, ancient bacteria alive today may have replicated millions of times, but are still, what is left of them, the same entities of the ancient era. If some portion never dies, though perhaps a bit evolved, can it be called life? Complex 'life' wins the name because it wins its complexity through a process of cell differentiation. But if that differentiation is incremental, if the cells of the zygote only very gradually alter into their ultimate role in the various tissues of the adult organism, then that differentiation cannot be determined genetically, but must entail a responsiveness in the organism as a whole, a sort of 'revaluation of all values', implicit to the genetic "code". Try this with a machine, mechanical or digital, and it would grind to a halt with each successive function required of it. But if there is good in the world the ability of each, if only in the least term, to revise all the meanings of the whole is the realest term of that good. But only if the community as a whole is articulated that good as the inestimable worth lost to it by the departure of that individual, as the greatest difference to the world its differentiation is, is there any world or any good in the world at all. Utilitarianism implies individualism, even as a kind of monsim. The monad counts itself a kind of constancy. Of one. What opens a way for good to enter the world through its departure is no such monad. In a way it is no 'one', as time itself is no 'one', and so cannot be identified by or traced to its ends. Person is the differentiation made real as the final term of a rigor meant to preserve it. To die anonymous is the most completed loss, as a wrinkle in time wholly anomalous to any extension of it is no beginning. But if there is a response entailing all of time in proving the notion of its extension incapable of completing even its beginning, then the ends of time is the act of differentiation (departure) so responded. Moment. Hence I can say with perfect seriousness that the least term of time is all the differing it is. We are biologically committed to differentiate, and so to die. We are psychologically committed to endure and to conceive of time as extension. But we are wrong to do so, as time will tell upon all. But in life, we can hardly build a world upon such anonymity as unrecognized death is. But what then creates a world is that despite the commitment necessary to it that we conceive the world as enduring and as a kind of completed time or count of time, we find that least term of time in a characterology of the conceit of enduring time, in personal reason or 'interior life', entailing a loss of that conceit, in some least term, as its extremity of rigor. We change our minds. But what entails that change is not that conceit, but the need each of us is of that freedom from that conceit the respondent needs to be responded in recognition of what good or worth it is in being proved that the ends of time is that the intimation, between that need and that freedom, is its moment.

“但导致这种变化的不是自负，而是我们每个人都需要摆脱自负的自由回应者需要得到回应，承认它的好处或价值，证明时间的终点是，在这种需要和自由之间的暗示，是它的时刻。”

Hunh.

Hmph! Harumph! The is a recently released movie in which the guy who played Wormtail in the Harry Potter movies plays an inarticulate artist. Turner, I think it is. He grunts his way through the picture, and critics rave about how much these grunts express. But I wonder what the 'linguistic scientists', like Chomski, make of them?
当我们改变主意的时候，这种改变，无论多么微小，难道不意味着要把别人从我们的幻想中解放出来吗?我的问题是，这到底有多“广泛”?它应该有多广泛?如果它打破了“是”和“不是”之间的密封，在先行和结果之间，指物和意图之间，原因和结果，社会权力和它的义务我们，它有多广泛?如果时间只是不同，那么需要多大的不同才能完全改变，重新定义和重新评估起点和终点是什么?光是改变主意就够白痴的了。它只能产生一种恶毒的辩证法，在这种辩证法中，它的回应者被碾压或碾压它。与此同时，这巨大的空间和时间(作为延伸)就像一个无情的怪物，抹去我们所认为的美好或爱。但如果这种抹去的连续性在任何思想行动的地方被打破，即使在一些极小的范围内，失去他们先前的信念是释放那些信念的回应者的一种方式，那么所有价值的重估是一种美德的辩证，就像重估是完整的一样。如果从那时起一切都改变了，要给这个世界带来数不清的美好，需要多大的改变? Doesn't it suggest a much more powerful engine of meaning discourse and reasoning than static systems can generate? If so, then what does 'more' mean?

"The Vicar of Dibley: Animals (#1.6)" (1994)
[first lines]
"Alice: You know that stuff that they're selling now at the local shop?
Geraldine Granger: Which stuff?
Alice: I Can't Believe It's Not Butter.
Geraldine Granger: Oh, yeah.
Alice: Well, you know, I can't believe it's not butter.
Geraldine Granger: Yeah, well, I believe that is the idea, yeah.
Alice: Then yesterday I went to Kirkenden and I bought this other stuff, like a sort of home brand, you know.
Geraldine Granger: Yes?
Alice: And, you know, I can't believe it's not I Can't Believe It's Not Butter.
杰拉尔丁·格兰杰:嗯?
[pause]
Geraldine Granger: I'm losing you now.
艾丽斯:哦,对了。你知道《我不敢相信这不是黄油》吗?
Geraldine Granger: Yeah, yeah, yeah, you think it is butter.
Alice: No, no. I mean, you know the stuff that I can't believe is not butter is called I Can't Believe It's Not Butter?
杰拉尔丁·格兰杰:可能，是的，是的。
我不敢相信那些不是“我不敢相信这不是黄油”的东西。我不敢相信《我不敢相信这不是黄油》和《我不敢相信这不是黄油》都不是黄油。我相信……它们都可能是黄油……在狡猾的伪装下。事实上，我们周围的黄油比我们想象的要多得多。
杰拉尔丁·格兰杰:是的。你看，我不知道你在说什么，但我相信上帝知道，而且对整个事情很感兴趣。”

Or..., maybe there's a lot more good in the world than Moore believes, which rather vexes the question. More good than we know how to put to use, or derive any pleasure from? Or analyse? But some things are too many to be one and too much to be so many. How the good differs from such vexed quantification may be the Holy Grail.

“我想知道的是，即使有所有这些(不切实际的)条件，当我们比较两个世界时，其中一个比另一个拥有更多公平分配的商品，那么拥有更多商品的世界一定会更好。人们对此有什么看法?"
Does the good Moore writes about really provide a context for this question? Isn't it more up Bentham's street? Or Mead's (who, I must admit, I at first, mistakenly, thought you had in mind). For Moore, the good is the ineffable exoteric around or within which the great chain of rational entailments is shaped. It is the external term meant to clinch the deal to a system that cannot include its first or final term. It seems like the dress dummy on which the chain-mail of machine reasoning of the analytic tradition is built. But how does one quantify the ineffable? You see, the quantifier is the necessary form of contradiction, without which analysis cannot claim to be pertinent to the real world. But that pertinence is bought at the price of keeping secrets between the terms of propositions. When I call this conceit I do not mean some sort of ego trip, I mean a mind-set that can only sustain itself by putting some part of itself beyond enquiry. And what I was getting at in earlier posts is that this inadequacy in formal reasoning expresses itself in small alterations in that conceit that we call emotions, the ebb and flow of certitude inevitable in a conceit that cannot sustain itself as the real term, and which enables its respondent to free itself of that conceit not its own. That response itself develops its own dynamic of its own conceit, enabling its respondent freed of it. The result is a virtuous dialectic through which all that rigor and discipline of sustaining that conceit, and the secrecy it entails between the terms of the propositions it manipulates in thought, becomes breached between us as the unhidden dynamic through which that conceit is lost. The virtuous dialectic introduces between us that unhidden dynamic of rigor which entails as its extremity the loss of its prejudicial secrecy. In introducing ourselves to each other there is something (who we are) recognized unhidden in the dynamic of lost conceit and freedom enabled through that loss, though just recognized yet unknown. But as we grow in lost conceit and freedom enabled through it we learn of that unhidden though yet unknown term (who each of us is) as the most extensive term of time and person. The truth of predication is only real in that growing intimacy between my lost conceit and your being freed of it, and vice versa. It is the community in contrariety, as I tried to explain earlier. It is also the engine of the good. whereas the quantifier analysis relies upon is the engine primarily of secrecy.
Can the goods of the world be maximized? I think it's ax stupid question, and implies a blazing conceit that some of us don't deserve to share in the goods of the world. This conceit is endemic in philosophy as it is in life. It is a stubborn injustice requiring some ineffable 'good' to keep us convinced of. Why is it, for instance, that Adam Smith refers to the maximum expectation of wage earners, and as a natural law consequnce, as "subsistance"? Don't the producers of the goods of the world deserve a better share in them? Is this a frivolous or impertinent question? Does truth really love to hide? Or do some of us love to hide it? I once goaded an economist to answer this. We were discussing the effects of raises of aging workers. "Do you think older workers become too well comfortable to sustain productivity?", I asked. "The trick is to keep the increments small enough!", he replied. I admit, I tricked the response out of him, but which trick is crueler?

The Moore stuff is all orthogonal to my topic: I think it was the first comment that brought up Moore on beauty. So I will let that poster respond. I don't care what the goods are conceived to be. We can take them to be pleasures or satisfactions of desires or whatever.
You also make the claim that "the more good the better"
implies a blazing conceit that some of us don't deserve to share in the goods of the world.
However, that claim ignores language you actually quoted from my initial post, viz., the "equitably distributed" in my question regarding whether "the more good the better" is true
when we compare two worlds in which one has more equitably distributed good(s) in it than the other.
so your stuff on that is largely off-topic as well.
OTOH，我认为增加商品的数量(或质量)对于罗尔斯的极大极小原则甚至帕累托最优都是不够的，这一点很重要。我不想淡化这一事实——正如我所说，我认为这很重要。我只是注意到，如果这是商品总论的一个缺陷，那么在福利经济学家中更常见的立场也是如此——比如森或阿罗的那些立场——这些立场(a)根本不能真正比较国家(以越好越好的方式)，因为不可能定理和自由悖论，以及(b)也需要任何帕累托最优性的要求作为单独的假设加入。也就是说，如果我们特别担心不公平的商品聚集，那么所有的比较方法(包括你的方法，如果你有的话)都是大致相同的，除非，就像我在最初的文章中指出的那样，公平分配被简单地视为商品。然而，如果你关心这些事情，那就有点欺骗了。

商品并不像洛克想让我们相信的那样，只是在那里捡拾并制造我们自己的，而不影响他人可能获得的东西。所以我的问题是，为什么斯密，一个自诩的伦理学家试图给一个疯狂的制度交换带来一些理性的伦理意义，却在他的论文中，贬低了那些真正生产商品的人，让他们生存?石头告诉我们，我们得到了我们需要的(如果我们努力，有时)，这很好，但我们得到了我们应得的吗?你把这个问题排除在问题范围之外。但这似乎是不公平的，也许还有点不诚实，如果它忽视了分销系统的内在缺陷的话。劳动人民不能被允许赶在“圈地法案”之前，一系列的经济利益设计了各种手段来清除我们的任何“剩余”。盈余(即使是公平分配的)的存在，对那些认为自己有权获得更多来破坏平衡的人来说，难道不是提供了太多的诱惑吗?我认为新政做得很对，实际上，考虑到当时的原始社会观点。它的问题源于政府和工业之间过于亲密的关系，最终又一次把人民排除在外。如果所有人的盈余不屈服于这种有害的社会力量，帕累托选项就不适用，这将是一个双赢的局面。 The Pareto option, it seems to me, excludes this out of hand. The question is, like Smith's 'subsistence', why do economic theories so (almost) universally exclude the possibility of a (healthy) surplus for wage earners? I don't see how you can honestly exclude this question from your discussion. My answer is that it has to do with the difference between the semantic power of value and the formal power of the quantifier. I'm sorry if you regard my remarks about Moore as beside the point, but I thought them interesting anyway, and, as explained here, rather more to the point than you might suppose.

Well, I suppose Dr. Pangloss would do a better job with your question than I did. I never could put much stock in alternative world scenarios. They play havoc with conservation of matter/energy. But the fact of the matter is that inequity is entropic. And the more goods there are in the world the more systematic the entropy. History proves this so plainly I don't know how you could ask your question. You cannot assume equity as goods increase. You must anticipate inequity, take countervailing measures, and then proceed. I think the world can get pretty good, but not if we think we can get there by fiat or Panglossian assumptions.