我不太同意。我被一个论点说服了我认为这个论点把我们引向了一个更道德的方向。
The argument is, I hope I am using the word correctly, Kantian in a sense.
If you realize yourself as a rational agent and if you "want moments in which I contemplate beauty", "want to perfect my abilities as a philosopher and use them to plumb the depths of the deepest philosophical mysteries", "want to explore the heights of erotic pleasure with my deepest love, to tend my roses", then you will perhaps agree that there are other rational agents who may have similar needs and desires. And if you philosophically elevate your ability to accomplish these tasks, by the same token, you will also elevate others' potential to do these.
So, I think helping others and being moral are not really supererogatory but just something you should do by rational considerations - it isn't an option. I realize that you mean immensely self-sacrifical acts by "the supererogatory" but I think the distinction between "the supererogatory" and "moral requirements" can be made rather arbitrarily. And most people think that just refraining from negative acts is enough to be moral and anything more is just supererogatory.

Nick:
我不确定你是同意还是不同意苏珊·沃尔夫的方法。你所说的道德完美似乎包含了很多沃尔夫所说的非道德的美德。从某种意义上讲，包含更多商品的生活，包括道德的和非道德的，似乎比包含更少商品的生活更好。我想沃尔夫不会否认这一点。她担心的是，更多道德商品的存在能否“弥补”非道德商品的缺失。显然，她不这么认为。
Cosmic:
I'm not sure I see why my own pursuit of, say, philosophical excellence, should necessarily have any impact on others. I could just sit in my study and think and never write a thing and never even appear on the radio. Similarly, even if I recognize that others have needs and desires like my own, nothing follows about whether I will or should devote my energies to helping others satisfy their needs and desires.

It depends on what you mean by "impact" and the distinction between a "passive" moral agent and an "active" moral agent.
I first heard about this distinction from the guy across the hall to you :P. Mr. Bobonich, in last year's Visions IHUM, at some point gave a very convincing example about the need to be actively engaged as a moral agent - that passiveness can not be moral. (This may not be his opinion but this is what I infer). His example was something like: Imagine that you are walking down a street in a rainy day and right next to you, a baby is drowning in a poodle of water. Would you consider yourself moral if you did nothing and just walked away? I think not. Similarly, in the face of the great evils perpetuated by other people, I think we should consider ourselves immoral if we simply do nothing. (Take the Iraqi War for instance.)
Noam Chomsky, when asked why he was involved in political activism to the point that he lacked a non-political social life, he answered something like "If someone was being beaten and oppressed in the street, would you just sit there and do nothing? In fact, I am surprised by how little I am involved and how even less other people are involved."
I think this notion of "having no impact upon others" is just a smoke-screen to smuggle theses that protect our selfish interests. As John Donne said, "No man is an island onto himself/Every man is part of the continent"
So, yes, if one was to spend one's life contemplating abstract philosophical or scientific notions that aren't practically related to life, I wouldn't consider that a well-lived life. I would consider such a person what Nietzsche called in the Birth of Tragedy "a spoilt idler in the garden of knowledge."
As for the other point about how our realization of ourselves relates to others, I'll let the another person across the hall to you do the talking. I hate to argue by authority(and I repent I have done many times so in this text) but Mr. Wood in his paper "On the Ethics of Embryonic Stem Cell Research", writes (emphasis mine):
为什么康德认为人的理性本性本身就是目的?正如我对他的理解，康德认为我们不能在做决定时使用理性，除非我们自身的理性本性具有特殊和主要的价值，因此，如果我们是一致的，那么其他人也同样如此。正是拥有理性行动的能力，尤其是自主行动的能力，从根本上使人成为一个人。理性本性的价值对我们提出的基本要求是，我们在行为中表达对理性本性的尊重，尤其是在我们对待他人的行为中。
Unless one has a solipsist view of the universe, I think it's only consistent if we are ACTIVELY moral - and such a requirement isn't supererogatory.
(Great show by the way. Keep up the good work!)

Poodle => Pond
Just a correction...

Ken:
If you truly want to explore ?philosophical excellence? I would argue that it requires your interaction with other minds, and I assume by your participation in forums such as this you agree. You could argue that you don?t have to, but the reasoning behind why interaction allows a better exploration is separate issue. And if through interaction, your pursuit of excellence allows others to pursue theirs you have added to the world?s utility.
The fact that not writing anything would have to be a conscious act to not leave anything behind I believe makes the argument as to how your pursuit of excellence is a moral good.
That said it is not merely pursuit of a moment of beauty and erotic experience but those we affect in that pursuit.
Cosmic:
Baby in a poodle (that?s a very bad dog ?) is a very tough moral rule. And the loophole is very F-451. By that definition as long as we have no knowledge of ?evils? we have no obligation. And conversely the more we know about our world the harder it will be to be moral regardless of the good we can do.
So can we tie moral goodness to what we know? What if I spend all of my time righting the wrongs in Iraq, which I might not be very good at, when on the other hand I could focus on a pursuit of excellence in an area to which I am more ?acclimated? (I would say that passions dictate this). This area might not posses the same ?positive moral ranking? as fixing Iraq, but if I can be more excellent at it perhaps I can add more positive utility to the world. Let?s say I start a business (something my passion will allow me to be excellent at) and employ a kid, who one day uses the money from the job to buy a book about international policy. That kid grows up to be president, and finally Iraq is fixed.
当然，这个故事很牵强，但不会比一只幼崽吃狮子狗更糟糕。这就把道德美德留给了我们的激情。如果我们的热情妨碍了别人阅读他们的呢?

Here are some thoughts on the question of desirability to be or to be with a saint. I liked the distinction of the "duty-bound" saint vs. the love-motivated saint. What I did not agree with was the concept of love that Susan suggested.
I believe that the saintly love that was discussed touches such deep levels of fullfilment that there is no need, in fact not even a thought of anything but that pursuit, even to the point of joyful self-neglect.
还有，跟圣人在一起不会“有趣”的想法让我难以置信。我想象中的圣人“与高兴的人一起高兴，与哭泣的人一起哭泣”——这可能包括对愤世嫉俗或低俗的笑话发笑。爱不等于自以为是!
Jost